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SUMMARY
This thesis studies security issues pertaining to the rapidly growing area of wireless net-
works. These networks afford many benefits compared to their wired counterparts in terms
of their usability in dynamic situations, mobility of networked devices, and accessibility to
hostile or hazardous environments. However, these networks create unique challenges that
must be addressed in order for them to be effective. The devices used in these networks are
generally assumed to be limited in resources such as energy, memory, communications range,
and computational ability. Additionally, these networks can operate in remote or hostile
environments, placing them in danger of being damaged upon deployment or compromised
by some malicious entity. This thesis addresses some of these issues in an attempt to in-
crease the security of these networks while still maintaining acceptable levels of networking
performance and resource usage.
We investigate new methods for data encryption on personal wireless hand-held devices.
An important consideration for resource-constrained devices is the processing required to
encrypt data for transmission or for secure storage. Significant latency from data encryp-
tion diminishes the viability of these security services for hand-held devices. Also, increased
processing demands require additional energy for each device, where both energy and pro-
cessing capability are limited. Therefore, one area of interest for hand-held wireless devices
is the ability to provide data encryption while minimizing the processing and energy over-
head as a cost to provide such a security service. We study the security of a wavelet-based
cryptosystem and consider its viability for use in hand-held devices.
This thesis also considers the performance of wireless sensor networks in the presence
of an adversary. The sensor nodes used in these networks are limited in available energy,
processing capability and transmission range. Despite these resource constraints and ex-
pected malicious attacks on the nodes in the network, these networks require widespread,
xiii
highly-reliable communications. Maintaining satisfactory levels of network performance and
security between entities is an important goal toward ensuring the successful and accurate
completion of desired sensing tasks. However, the resource-constrained nature of the sen-
sor nodes used in these applications provides challenges in meeting these networking and
security requirements. We consider link-compromise attacks and node-spoofing attacks on
wireless sensor networks, and we consider the performance of various key predistribution
schemes applied to these networks. We investigate the resilience of networks with regard to
different adversarial attacks. Furthermore, we propose new key predistribution techniques
to improve the security of wireless sensor networks.
xiv
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks have become vital components in the telecommunications industry both
in current applications as well as in research and development efforts. They have been
found to be suitable for use in a multitude of applications involving communications and the
networking of information between various entities. The wireless aspect of these networks
affords many benefits compared to their wired counterparts in terms of their usability
in dynamic situations, mobility of networked devices, and access to hostile or hazardous
environments. However, the nature of these devices also creates unique challenges that must
be dealt with in order to achieve adequate performance for their intended purposes. When
considering wireless devices, it is generally assumed that they are limited in resources such
as energy, memory, communications range, and computational ability. Additionally, these
networks will operate in remote areas in certain scenarios, putting them at risk of being
compromised or destroyed by an adversarial entity. Depending on the type of network
and deployment environment, the priority of these limitations varies. We are interested
in networking situations that pertain to commercial and military applications for wireless
networks. We have considered various networking scenarios and addressed the limitations
of these environments to maximize the performance of a network employing specific security
services.
In terms of commercial applications for wireless devices, the primary challenges stem
from the limitations in computational performance and available energy. Personal data as-
sistants (PDAs) and cellular phones are two widely-used examples of resource-constrained
devices used in wireless networks. The deployment environment presents a scenario where
conserving energy for the processing and transmission of data is of paramount importance.
Processors in these devices are significantly limited compared to those found on wired net-
works. The use of these devices is likely to be in a mobile situation, presenting a situation
1
where having boundless energy is not feasible. An ever-present challenge in wireless de-
vices for consumer applications is to optimize computational performance and other energy
intensive functions to maximize battery lifetimes.
In addition to limitations of the available processing and energy, another factor that
places a burden on these wireless devices is the security of information. The environment in
which these devices operate is an open environment, where any data being transmitted is
vulnerable to attacks from malicious entities. Any data sent on wireless channels is subject
to potential eavesdropping, which eliminates the privacy of information being stored or
transmitted. As in any security application, securing systems or networks is best carried
out in a multi-level fashion [94]. Providing a single level of fortification against adversarial
attacks is not desirable nor is it possible to defend against all varieties of adversaries. The
necessity of employing any security service on these devices increases the strain on the
limited processing and available stored energy. For instance, to guarantee the privacy of
information, data encryption is one solution that is available. Having this service improves
the overall security of the network, but the network incurs transmission and processing
overhead. Given the existing limitations with the processors and stored energy, the increase
in bit-rates and processing from the added security services further stresses the devices of
the network. The challenge that we consider is minimizing these incurred overheads while
still providing certain levels of security in the network.
There are a great number of proposed military applications for wireless networks. Some
applications are made of large-scale networks of networks, where devices with unbounded
resources communicate over long distances using high bandwidths. With a large amount
of information being transferred, high accuracy and low transmission delay are of utmost
importance. Applications of wireless networks for tactical purposes can also be found on the
very small-scale spectrum of devices, where networks of small radio-frequency (RF) devices
are deployed to perform a specific mission. Collaboration of a large number of these devices
attains similar capabilities as smaller networks of more capable devices. The attractive
features of the small devices are their flexibility in their deployment configuration and the
wide variety of potential applications. Since it is likely that these tactical wireless networks
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will operate in adverse environments where it is infeasible for other types of networks,
harsher networking restrictions and requirements are necessary.
The wireless sensor network is one variety of a tactical wireless network, which is a
network of small radio-frequency (RF) sensor nodes that is deployed into a remote envi-
ronment. These networks are deployed to gather data and relay the information back to a
central base station for further processing and decision-making. Each constituent node is
limited in transmission range and available energy, and it does not necessarily have direct
contact with the base station. Thus, the nodes have to communicate with the base station
in a multi-hop fashion through other sensor nodes. Their remote deployment furthers the
restriction of the available energy as replacing or recharging the stored energy in nodes is
not viable. In addition to the transmission range and energy limitations, remote deployment
results in a physical vulnerability of the nodes in these networks. With the flexibility of
deployment and potentially boundless capabilities of such networks, there have been many
proposed applications for wireless sensor networks [3, 36]. However, the networking per-
formance of wireless sensor networks in response to their physical vulnerability must be
addressed in order to successfully deploy these networks for any application.
Many proposed applications for wireless sensor networks call for the nodes to be ran-
domly deployed or dispersed into a field. Upon deployment, some nodes may be damaged
or functional but not able to communicate with any other node because of its limited com-
munication range. The physical vulnerability of the nodes presents a challenge that the
network must still function properly even after some of the nodes are captured by an adver-
sary. Additionally, the adversary may attempt to degrade the performance of the network
or even try to use the captured nodes for its own malicious actions. The conflicting require-
ments of acceptable performance and security are necessary properties of these networks;
however, optimizing these properties is the challenge.
This work considers the performance of resource-constrained devices by investigating two
separate problems within the area of security for wireless networks. Figure 1.1 is an illustra-
tion of a wireless network, and it highlights the two main areas of wireless network research
that we have investigated: link security and network security. These two security-related
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issues have been considered separately in the context of resource-constrained devices. First,
we examine the performance of a new cryptosystem for use in commercial applications to
provide data encryption. This work investigates link security for wireless communications
between hand-held devices. Second, we investigate key management schemes for wireless
sensor networks and examine the performance of the network in the presence of an adver-
sary. This work evaluates the viability of security services of the network on a global scale.
Link
Figure 1.1: Illustration of a network of wireless devices.
1.1 Link security
In Part 1 of this thesis, we investigate new methods for data encryption on personal wireless
hand-held devices. An important consideration for resource-constrained devices is the pro-
cessing required to encrypt data for transmission or for secure storage. Significant latency
from data encryption diminishes the viability of these security services for hand-held devices.
Also, increased processing demands require additional energy for each device, where both
energy and processing capability are limited. Therefore, one area of interest for hand-held
wireless devices is being able to provide data encryption while minimizing the processing
and energy overhead as a cost to provide such a security service. The research will focus on
wavelet-based schemes to address the constraints we have mentioned.
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Chapter 2 presents background information for classical cryptosystems, traditional crypt-
analytic techniques, and concepts fundamental to wavelet-based encryption. Chapter 3
presents an analysis of the Wavelet Block Cipher (WBC), a private key cryptosystem based
on the finite-field wavelet. The encryption and decryption are performed by the synthesis
and analysis banks of the nonlinear finite-field wavelet transform, whose filter coefficients
are the secret keys. The wavelets operate over GF(256) and the structure of the cryp-
tosystem also includes a nonlinear device that performs a mapping of the field elements
to their inverse in the field. In this thesis, the security and computational complexity of
WBC are studied and compared to both the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [70] and
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [22]. First, we assess WBC from a cryptanalytic
standpoint. The security is tied to the wavelet basis function and to the nonlinear function
within the WBC encryption round. Additionally, we study the security of the block-cipher
wavelet cryptosystem in response to classical attacks and attacks specific to the wavelet
structure. In particular, the cryptanalytic methods chosen to be studied with regard to
WBC are the divide-and-conquer attack, the interpolation attack, and attacks using prop-
erties of the discrete Fourier transform. We show that chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA) on
WBC reduce to the problem of solving sets of nonlinear equations over finite-fields. While
considering classical and algorithm-specific attacks, the computational complexity to per-
form these attacks is compared to the exhaustive key search. If a particular attack has a
complexity greater than the exhaustive key search, then the cryptosystem is considered to
be resilient to that particular attack. The contribution of this thesis to WBC encryption
for resource-constrained hand-held devices focused on security analysis.
1.2 Network security
Part 2 of this thesis considers the performance of wireless sensor networks in response to
the addition of security services and the presence of an adversary. These networks require
widespread, highly-reliable communications even after malicious attacks. Maintaining sat-
isfactory levels of network performance and security between entities is an important goal
toward ensuring the successful and accurate completion of desired sensing tasks. However,
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the resource-constrained nature of the sensor nodes used in these applications provides chal-
lenges in meeting these networking and security requirements. The primary limitation of
these devices is the available energy for each of the nodes. This constraint limits the amount
of processing and communications a node can complete before running out of energy. Be-
cause of the remote nature of these deployments, it is not viable for the energy supplies to be
recharged or replaced. Additionally, the communications range is limited, forcing each node
to communicate through other nodes to transmit information to a particular destination.
Every node cannot directly communicate with a trusted third party (TTP), so imple-
menting specific security services becomes a challenge. For instance, public key infrastruc-
tures (PKI) [85, 97] provide a solution to distribute session keys for data encryption, but
without a TTP in direct communication with each node, this is not possible. Communi-
cating with the TTP over multiple-hops renders the network susceptible to the man-in-
the-middle attack, an attack that compromises all perceived security gained from the PKI.
A recently proposed solution to the key distribution problem for wireless sensor networks
is key predistribution. In this situation, each node is given key information prior to de-
ployment. After deployment, nodes establish secure communications links with neighbor
nodes based on shared key information. As stated previously, the physical vulnerability of
the nodes allows an adversary to gain access to key information in the network. A goal
of the key predistribution scheme is to minimize the capability of the adversary while still
providing an acceptable networking performance.
The capability of the adversary depends on the ability of the adversary in addition to
the amount of resources compromised. In this thesis, we consider adversaries of various
strengths and determine to what extent a malicious attack has harmed the performance
of the network. For each of these attacks, we measure the increased effectiveness of the
adversary as a function of the fraction of the network that the adversary has captured.
Based on the key predistribution scheme used in the wireless sensor network, the resources
compromised vary with the number of nodes compromised. With regard to network security,
we consider two types of attacks: link compromise and node spoof. An adversary wanting
to gain access to information being encrypted and transmitted in the network will attempt
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to compromise the links in the network. Given a compromised link, the adversary is able
to obtain any information transmitted through the once-secure link. This attack is realized
by obtaining the keys used to create the targeted links, by capturing other nodes in the
network that have the desired keys. We also consider an adversary that is attempting to
insert a spoofed node into the network and not be detected as an adversarial node. If this
is possible, the adversary can use the spoofed node to perform malicious tasks within the
unsuspecting network.
Within the scenario of adversarial attacks on wireless sensor networks, we analyze several
aspects of the performance of the network. Chapter 2 presents background material relating
to wireless sensor networks and proposed security services for these networks. The key
predistribution schemes that we primarily consider in this work are the base scheme or the
random key predistribution scheme (qcomp, base) and the multivariate key predistribution
scheme (mkps). We also consider variants of these schemes.
In Chapter 4, we consider the connectivity property of wireless sensor networks and
key predistribution schemes. Here, we explore the link-compromise attack and establish
a metric measuring the resilience of the connectivity of a network to the link-compromise
attack. The resource cost of implementing key predistribution schemes on wireless sensor
networks is also explored. We investigate the effect of adversarial attacks on the resilience
of secure links generated by key predistribution schemes for wireless sensor networks. These
network properties are examined by determining the communication range required of each
node to provide global connectivity to the network. We develop a resiliency-connectivity
metric, which is used to compare the resilience of networks against the link-compromise
attack in terms of the connectivity property of networks.
Chapter 5 investigates the performance of wireless sensor networks and key predistri-
bution schemes for properties other than connectivity. We add the temporal aspect in our
analysis of network resilience of node compromise attacks. In our consideration of network
properties involving the temporal aspect in wireless networks we show the following results.
We measure the average packet latency and packet reliability in a data-gathering scenario.
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Using results of latency measurements for different parameters, the throughput and ca-
pacity of these networks is determined. Similar to the results in Chapter 4, the resilience
of networks to link-compromise attacks in terms of latency and maximum throughput are
examined.
Our contributions in Chapter 6 pertain to the node-spoofing attack. In contrast to the
adversarial ability when considering link-compromise attacks in sensor networks, the node-
spoofing attack requires an increased amount of resources but provides a more capable
adversary. We consider the strength of key predistribution schemes against the node-spoof
attack. Additionally, we design key predistribution schemes that possess increased resilience
to the node-spoofing attack compared to existing schemes. We also consider the node-
spoofing attack with several adversarial models that use attackers of varying capability.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
This chapter provides an overview of the topics pertinent to the work discussed in the
remainder of this work. Section 2.1 establishes some commonly used notation and definitions
for the two main research areas. In Section 2.2, we discuss the major background and
current developments within block cipher cryptosystems and cryptanalytic techniques. We
also provide some fundamental principles of filter banks, which is necessary for our work
in Chapter 3. Section 2.3 contains an overview of properties of wireless sensor networks,
several security services, and common adversarial models.
2.1 Notation and Definitions
This section contains an overview of the notation and definitions used throughout this work.
Additional terms may be defined in individual sections as necessary. First, we define some
notation regarding wavelet-based cryptography that is presented in Chapter 3. Second,
we define some notation and network models used for the study of security and network
performance of wireless sensor networks, which is used in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
2.1.1 Cryptography: terms and usage
We establish common notation for the investigation of cryptosystems for hand-held devices.
In this work, we consider cryptographic primitives, specifically block ciphers. The encryp-
tion of plaintext, P , with secret key, K, yields ciphertext, C = EK(P ). When considering
block ciphers, the input and output are a block of x contiguous bits. Some common terms
and notation related to encryption using block ciphers are defined in Table 2.1.
Additionally, we consider a new cryptographic primitive and present the recently pro-
posed wavelet block cipher, which is comprised of elementary encryption and decryption
blocks based on the finite-field wavelet. We define these blocks and their usage in Table 2.2
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Table 2.1: Common cryptographic terms and usage
C(m) Ciphertext block m.
P (m) Plaintext block m.
EK(P ) Encryption of P with key K.
DK(P ) Decryption of P with key K.
Ceven The even indices of C, where C = Ceven|Codd.
Codd The odd indices of C, where C = Ceven|Codd.
[C(m)C(m+1)] Consecutive blocks of ciphertext.
We consider arithmetic in the Galois Field, GF(256) a finite-field of order 256 and charac-
teristic 2. For any elements in GF(256), addition and multiplication are closed operations.
Also, for any element α in GF(256), we define Inv(α) = α−1 for any non-zero α, where
Inv(0) = 0. Within each of the encryption and decryption structures for WBC, there are
elementary encryption and decryption blocks, which have matrix representations T (i)’s and
F (i), respectively. The index (i) denotes unique occurrence of that elementary block in the
cryptosystem. For each of the elementary blocks in WBC, the filter coefficients e
(i)
oo (n) are
defined by the secret key. Several terms specific to the wavelet-based encryption are defined
in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Wavelet-based encryption terms and usage
T (i) The ith Elementary encryption block.
F (i) The ith Elementary decryption block.
F (ab) The cascade of the ath and bth elementary decryption block,
F (ab) = F (a)F (b).
Additionally, in the construction of the wavelet-based cryptosystem, one-circulant and
two-circulant matrices are employed. These are defined as follows.
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• We denote by π the permutation matrix defined by
π =


0 1 0 · · · 0
0 0 1 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 0 0 · · · 0


(2.1)
It is clear that if π has dimension M , then πT = π−1 = πM−1.
• We denote one-circulant matrices by 1-circ(a). A one-circulant matrix is defined by
its first row a = [a0, a1, . . . , aM−1], and the ith row is equal to (π
i−1aT )T . In other
words, the ith row is equal to the left-to-right cyclic shift of the vector a by (i− 1).
• We denote two-circulant matrices by 2-circ(a). A two-circulant matrix is defined by
its first row a = [a0, a1, . . . , aM−1], and the ith row is equal to (π
2i−2aT )T .
2.1.2 Wireless sensor networks: notation and models
With respect to our work regarding to wireless sensor networks, we use the following notation
and definitions. The network consists of n nodes randomly distributed into a field of unit
area. Each node has communication radius r(n), which in this work we consider a uniform
radius. The set of nodes that a node can directly communicate with is its neighborhood.
In the data gathering scenario, a base station is located in the center of the unit area at
coordinate (0.5, 0.5). Some commonly used terms within these networks are listed in Table
2.3.
With regard to the node-compromise attacks, we consider x compromised nodes or pc,
the fraction of nodes in the network which are compromised. For matters of analysis, pe is
the probability of establishing a link and psf is the probability of sensor properly functioning.
We define the the probability of secure key establishment pk, and the probability of a
link being compromised by the adversary to be pℓ. This thesis investigates these network
properties further and defines several parameters within these two properties. To facilitate
analysis, we consider several random graph models to represent wireless sensor networks.
They are listed in Table 2.4. Each of these graphs represent a specific situation of the
wireless sensor network problem that we address.
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Table 2.3: Wireless sensor network notation and usage
vi Node with identity i
N(vi) Neighbor hood of node i
kvi Key ring of node i
kjvi The jth key in the key ring of node i
kij = kji Shared keys between node i and j
P Key pool size
P ′ Compromised key pool
PN(vi) Key pool of neighborhood of vi
λ Key threshold
#(k) Number of occurrences of key k in the remaining nodes
Table 2.4: Random graph models for wireless sensor networks
G(n, p) Erdo¨s – Re´nyi random graph
G(n, r) Geometric random graph
G(n, r, pk) Secure connectivity random graph
G(n, r, pk, pc) Compromised secure connectivity random graph
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These random graph models provide representations that are usable approximations
for the behavior of wireless sensor networks. The Erdo¨s–Re´nyi random graph, G(n, p),
is a graph of n nodes and there is an edge between any two nodes in the network with
probability p. The geometric random graph, G(n, r), is a graph of n nodes and there is an
edge between any two nodes that are within distance r. The secure connectivity random
graph, G(n, r, pk), is similar to the geometric graph, except that there is an edge between
any two nodes that are within distance r with probability pk. Also, the compromised secure
connectivity random graph, G(n, r, pk, pc), represents a secure connectivity random graph
where a fraction pc of the nodes are removed from the network. In Chapters 4 and 5, we
see that the parameter pc has an effect on the rate of link compromise rate, pℓ.
2.2 Cryptographic primitives: block ciphers
In 1949, Shannon began the discussion of information secrecy [91]. In the classical descrip-
tion of the security we are attempting to achieve, we imagine that two entities, Alice and
Bob, wish to exchange messages through an insecure channel in such a way that an adver-
sary Oscar cannot understand the communication. The security service described here is
one of data secrecy, which is carried out through use of cryptographic techniques. Two cat-
egories that cryptographic schemes can be broken down into are public key cryptosystems
and private key cryptosystems.
In general, the public key systems are used to private key systems generally use to
establish secret keys and then use private key systems for the encryption of data to be
transmitted. The difference in the computational complexity between public and private
key systems is significant enough to warrant such use. Assuming session keys are already
established between two devices, there still is an accrued overhead when encrypting with
private key cryptosystems. Compared to sending data in the clear, these cryptosystem
inherently require an overhead of extra computations and energy usage. Minimizing the
overhead of the encryption schemes is desirable in the case of hand-held devices. Two com-
mon private key cryptosystems that provide acceptable security and minimal computational
complexity are the Advanced Encryption Standard [22] and the Data Encryption Standard
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DES [70], referred to as AES and DES, respectively.
The fundamental building block for security is the cryptographic primitive. Other cryp-
tographic functions are built from this building block, such as block ciphers, stream ciphers,
hash functions, and digital signatures. These primitives are perceived to be nearly one-way
functions without knowledge of the secret key. With the secret key, they are easily invert-
ible. Here, we focus on the block cipher, a private key cryptosystem that uses a secret key
K to operate on fixed blocks of input/plaintext P and produce an output/ciphertext C of
the same length (EK(P ) = C). These systems are also considered to be symmetric, in that
the decryption of the ciphertext takes the same key and uses the same encryption functions
to recover the plaintext.
Data Encryption Standard (DES): The Data Encryption Standard, commonly re-
ferred to as DES, is a cryptosystem that was introduced for use in the 1970s. Its basis is
the Feistel cipher, on which many encryption algorithms are based [73, 89, 68, 10, 1, 86].
The Feistel cipher consists of a simple non-linear function that is repeated many times to
achieve its security. The security of DES is based on a nonlinear operation called the s-box.
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES): A more recent development in the cryp-
tographic community is the development of the Advanced Encryption Standard, referred
to as AES. After an open call and competition throughout the cryptographic community,
a new encryption standard called Rjindael was selected as the new standard, AES. The
encryption and decryption are done by repeatedly executing several simple functions over
a specified number of rounds on 128-bit blocks. The key is also 128 bits although Rjindael
is capable of various other encryption block sizes. The State is the working ciphertext and
RoundKey is the key used in each round that follows a publicly known key schedule such
that each round key is derived from the original key K. One round of AES consists of the
following operations on State: ByteSub(State), ShiftRow(State), MixColumn(State),
and AddRoundKey(State, RoundKey). The transformations in AES can be represented as
matrix operations. The arithmetic is done in GF(28).
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2.2.1 Classical cryptanalytic techniques
According to Kerckhoffs’ principle, the security of these cryptosystems is based on the
adversary only not knowing the secret key [54]. It is assumed that the structure of the
algorithm is publicly known, so the adversary’s goal is simply to determine the secret key.
Of paramount importance to any cryptosystem is the analysis of the security of these algo-
rithms. The necessity for novel and more complex cryptographic algorithms is rooted in the
cryptanalysis of these algorithms. As new cryptographic primitives are introduced, so too
are new cryptanalytic techniques. We outline several desirable properties of cryptographic
algorithms, those that have exhibited strength against known attacks. Also, we include a
description of some of the known attacks on cryptosystems.
There are several attack types for the cryptanalysis of these algorithms. There are
chosen plaintext attacks (CPA), where the adversary is able to select plaintext and observe
the output ciphertext for a particular instance of a cryptosystem. Conversely, there are also
chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA). Less powerful or able attacks are the known plaintext
and ciphertext attacks (KPA, KCA), where pairs of plaintext and ciphertext are available.
We note that for block ciphers, the variants of ciphertext and plaintext attacks are similar
because of the structure of the encryption.
There are several desirable properties of cryptographic algorithms that can be used to
prove resilience against some known methods of attack. Shannon introduces confusion and
diffusion properties [91]. In these systems he talks of information secrecy being attained
with a complex mixing of the key and the plaintext and a dependence of every bit of the
ciphertext on every bit of the plaintext. For instance, AES claims full diffusion in two rounds
of encryption. Webster furthered the idea by introducing the Strict Avalanche Criterion
[98], which states that flipping one bit in the plaintext results in each bit in the ciphertext to
change with p = 0.5. Also, it is desirable for cryptosystems not to have weak keys. In these
situations, encryption with weak keys results in a system with some undesirable properties.
For instance in DES, the keys {[064], [164], [132|032], [032|132]} result in the property where
encrypting twice with the same key recovers the plaintext, EK(EK(P )) = P . Weak keys
can additionally cause the cryptosystem to exhibit poor security.
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We now introduce the major cryptanalytic techniques that gave rise from a security
analysis of DES. Attributed to Biham and Shamir, differential cryptanalysis [6] was found
to provide a vulnerability in DES. Matsui is credited for developing Linear cryptanalysis
[67]. Linear and differential attacks [6, 67] are two classical cryptanalytic attacks that
have exposed security vulnerabilities in many cryptographic algorithms. The viability of
these attacks is based on the presence of strong characteristics. Occurring with a certain
probability, a characteristic is a relationship of plaintext, ciphertext, and key bits that spans
one or more rounds of the elementary round function. Attacks are formed by concatenating
these characteristics to establish a relationship among bits of the plaintext, ciphertext, and
key bits of the full cryptographic algorithm.
The differential characteristic considers the distribution of the output differential (here
the XOR operation is considered) of two decrypted plaintexts corresponding to two chosen
ciphertexts with a fixed differential XOR. The non-linear functions with the highest degree
of non-uniformity in the distribution among the ciphertext XOR pairs are vulnerable to a
differential attack.
To define the differential characteristic, let there be two plaintexts P , P ∗ with a bitwise
XOR of P ′ (P = P ⊕ P ∗) and two ciphertexts C and C∗ with a bitwise XOR of C ′
(C = C ⊕ C∗). A strong characteristic is defined to be the pair of P ′ and C ′ that occurs
with maximum probability, p, for any K. With P ′, there are 2N pairs of P, P ∗, where N is
the block length, that have a bitwise XOR of P ′. Encrypting each P, P ∗ with K, results in
EK(P ) and EK(P
∗). We then determine C ⊕ C∗ = EK(P )⊕ EK(P ) and find the C ′ that
occurs most often for any choice of K. The strong differential characteristics occur with
maximal probability, p.
Definition 1. Differential Characteristic: The choice of P ′ and C ′ ∈ {Z2}N that maximizes
p = #{ (P ⊕ P ∗) ∀ C ⊕ C∗ = C ′}/2N ∀ Kǫ{Z2}N .
For linear cryptanalysis, the linear characteristic attempts to take advantage of potential
linear structures in the non-linear function. There may exist some correlation between some
ciphertext, key, and plaintext bits or symbols. The characteristic attempts to find such a
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correlation that may be satisfied with probability, p, with strong bias, either close to zero
probability or almost certainty, |p− 12 | > 0. For the definition of a linear characteristic, let
Pi, Ci, and Ki be the i
th bit in a block of the plaintext, ciphertext and key, respectively.
The characteristic is a combination of an arbitrary subset of bits of P , C, and K, where
P = DK(C). Let these subsets of P , C, and K be indexed by {i1, i2 . . . im}, {j1, j2 . . . jn},
and {r1, r2 . . . rℓ}, respectively. The cardinality of the subsets ℓ, m, and n, is arbitrary. The
characteristic is the relationship for which the XOR sum over all these bits is maximized.
p is the probability that this relationship holds for the choice of C, K, and associated
P = DK(C).
Definition 2. Linear Characteristic: The fixed subset of indices of P , K, C so that [Pi1 ⊕
· · · ⊕ Pim ] ⊕ [Kr1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Krn ] = [Cj1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Cjℓ ] is satisfied with probability p such that
|p− 1/2| is maximized ∀ C, K.
Additionally, with the growing trend of finite-field arithmetic in cryptographic algo-
rithms, attacks considering the mathematical structure of these systems were explored.
Such algebraic attacks such as interpolation attacks were found to be viable on some cryp-
tosystems [20, 49]. These attacks are based on the idea that there is a mathematical
structure in the encryption, where breaking the cryptosystem reduces to solving a system
of equations.
2.2.2 The wavelet transform and multi-rate filter banks
Wavelets and multi-rate filter banks have received a great amount of development within
the signal processing community [77]. As shown in Figure 2.1, these filter banks offer perfect
reconstruction and low computational complexity. Furthermore, Fekri extends the theory of
wavelets and filter banks to provide a theory of wavelet decomposition of sequences defined
over finite-fields [37, 39, 38, 40, 41].
In finite-field wavelets and filter banks, all the coefficients in the filters and all of the
sample values are taken from a finite field and the arithmetic is carried out in that field.
If the field is GF (p), p a prime, then addition and multiplication are defined modulo-p. In
fields of the form GF (pr), where r > 1, any number a can be represented by a polynomial
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Figure 2.1: Two-channel analysis/synthesis filter bank.
of degree r − 1 with coefficients from GF (p). Then, addition is defined as addition of
polynomials in GF (p), and multiplication is defined to be polynomial multiplication modulo
a fixed polynomial q(y). The polynomial q(y) must be an irreducible polynomial of degree
r over GF (p) [58].
We describe Figure 2.1 and the perfectly reconstructing property for the wavelet trans-
form along with its representation with matrix transforms. Consider a two-channel max-
imally decimated filter bank with two analysis filters with impulse responses h0(n) =
{h0(0), h0(1), · · · , h0(N − 1)} and h1(n) = {h1(0), h1(1), · · · , h1(N − 1)}. In the analy-
sis bank of Fig. 2.1, the operation of filtering periodic signals followed by decimation by a
factor of two can be described using two-circulant matrices as:
y0(n) =
N−1∑
i=0
x(i)h0((2n− i))N = (H0x)(n)
y1(n) =
N−1∑
i=0
x(i)h1((2n− i))N = (H1x)(n),
(2.2)
in whichH0 = 2-circ(h
R
0 ) andH1 = 2-circ(h
R
1 ) areM×N 2-circulant matrices defined by the
analysis filters h0(n) and h1(n). The operation (())N denotes a circular shift of length N . In
the synthesis bank, the filters have impulse responses g0(n) = {g0(0), g0(1), · · · , g0(N − 1)}
and g1(n) = {g1(0), g1(1), · · · , g1(N −1)}. The relationship between the analysis filters and
the synthesis filters in
hj((n))N = gj((−n))N j = 0, 1 n = 0, . . . , N − 1. (2.3)
The upsampling of periodic signals by a factor of two followed by the filtering opera-
tion can be described by (column-wise) 2-circulant matrices G0 = [2-circ(g0)]
T and G1 =
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[2-circ(g1)]
T :
x(n) =
M−1∑
i=0
y0(i)g0((n− 2i))N +
M−1∑
i=0
y1(i)g1((n− 2i))N
= (G0y0)(n) + (G1y1)(n).
(2.4)
The above formulation holds for the general class of two-channel cyclic filter banks. By
using (2.3), these transforms can be described in the following
Hj =


gj(0) gj(1) · · · gj(N − 1)
gj(N − 2) gj(N − 1) · · · gj(N − 3)
...
...
...
...
gj(2) gj(3) · · · gj(1)


for j = 0, 1. (2.5)
Also, because of relation (2.3), the synthesis matrices are the transposes of the analysis
matrices:
Gj = H
T
j j = 0, 1. (2.6)
From the perfect reconstruction constraint x = G0H0x+G1H1x, it is possible to determine
that
[HT0 H
T
1 ]

 H0
H1

 = IN×N . (2.7)
Finite-field wavelets have been proposed to serve as an elementary building block for the
construction of cryptographic primitives. These transforms possess a rich history in signal
processing, and these frameworks can be adopted into algorithms in the cryptographic
community.
2.3 Security of wireless sensor networks
Security in many applications for wireless sensor networks is paramount. Sensor nodes
are deployed into some hostile environments, where there are adversaries present who are
attempting to degrade or destroy the performance of its intended use. Security in wireless
sensor networks distinguishes itself from other varieties of networks in that there are the
resource-constrained nodes and the lack of physical security. It is assumed that nodes are not
safe, as an adversary may have direct access to any number of nodes. The security schemes
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developed for IP-based networks cannot be used. Universal addressing is not viable because
of the scale and limitations of memory and computation on each of the nodes. Generally,
nodes are only aware of their neighborhood and perhaps the base station.
We consider the key management problem for wireless sensor networks. First we describe
public key cryptosystems and provide justification for why these schemes are infeasible for
this variety of networks. We present key predistribution schemes proposed in response to this
limitation. We then present an overview of malicious attacks on wireless sensor networks.
lastly, we briefly introduce several networking properties and components necessary for
analysis of these networks.
2.3.1 Key distribution in wireless networks
In order to provide data privacy to communications throughout the network, it is necessary
to securely distribute keys to the nodes throughout the network. We describe several public
key cryptosystems and key predistribution schemes that are used by networks to establish
session keys.
2.3.1.1 Public key cryptography
Public key systems are used by two parties to establish session keys in a network over
an insecure communication channel. Subsequent transmissions can be encrypted using
this session key. Each party must consult a trusted third party (TTP) for some public
information about the other party in order to execute such algorithms. Two commonly-
used algorithms are the Diffie-Hellman key exchange [97] and the RSA algorithm [85]. We
briefly describe the construction of these two cryptosystems.
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange operates on the multiplicative group of integers
modulo p. With p being a large prime and g being a primitive root of p, these two parameters
are publicly known. Given a private key for each user in the network, the algorithm is to
establish the key gba mod p between Alice and Bob is shown in Table 2.5. The security of
this key exchange algorithm is in solving for x given y, g, p, where y = gx mod p. This is
the equivalent to solving the discrete-logarithm problem.
RSA is another public key cryptosystem which operates by dealing with large prime
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Table 2.5: Diffie-Hellman key exchange between Alice and Bob
Alice Bob
p, g (public) p, g
a (private) b
ga mod p →
← gb mod p
(gb mod p)a mod p (gb mod p)a mod p
gba mod p = gab mod p
numbers. Again, these public key systems are generally used to generate secret keys for use
with faster, more efficient private key cryptosystems. We briefly describe the fundamental
RSA algorithm.
Each party in the network creates a private and public key by selecting two large prime
numbers p, q. This establishes the modulus for the keys, n = pq. The totient function ϕ(n)
is then computed by ϕ(n) = (p− 1)(q− 1). The party then chooses e, where 1 < e < ϕ(n).
Additionally, d is chosen such that de ≡ 1 mod ϕ(n). The user then has (d, n) as its private
key and (e, n) as its public keys. Alice is able to transmit securely to Bob using his public
key (eb, n). This is described in Table 2.6 as Alice is able to send the message m to Bob.
In the key exchange scenario, this message is the session key, m = kab.
Table 2.6: RSA secure communications between Alice and Bob
Alice Bob
ea, n (public) eb, n
da, n (private) db, n
c = meb mod n →
cdb mod n
mebdb mod n
m mod n
The security of the RSA scheme is found in the difficulty in factoring the product large
prime numbers. If an adversary is able to factor p, q from n, then he is able to determine d
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for any user given e.
Given the limitations of resource-constrained devices in wireless sensor networks, there
are two primary reasons why public key cryptosystems are infeasible. First, it is appar-
ent from the two public key systems introduced that there is a significant computational
complexity to establish a session key. For both of these schemes exponentiation is required
to encrypt messages. Although there exist methods to reduce the complexity of these op-
erations, these schemes will consume vast amounts of processing and energy. Second, the
communication range limitation for the deployed nodes causes some of the nodes not to be
in direct contact with the base station. Assuming that the base station acts as the trusted
third party for the public key cryptosystems, all nodes would not have direct access to
the public information required for these schemes. Attempting to acquire this information
through intermediate sensor nodes makes any key established in this way to be suscepti-
ble to the man-in-the-middle attack. The adversary launching this attack would be able
to decrypt all information transmitted between the attacked nodes. The description of
this attack is detailed in Table 2.7, where the adversary Oscar, unsuspecting to Alice and
Bob, establishes keys with himself and the two instead of between Alice and Bob using the
man-in-the-middle attack.
Table 2.7: Diffie-Hellman key exchange and the man-in-the-middle attack
Alice Oscar Bob
p, g (public) p, g (public) p, g
a (private) o (private) b
ga mod p
go mod p →
← gbmodp
← go mod p ← gb mod p
(go mod p)a mod p (gomodp)b mod p
(go mod p)a mod p
(go mod p)b mod p
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2.3.1.2 Key predistribution in wireless sensor networks
As public key systems are not considered to be a viable solution for the key management
in wireless sensor networks, attention is given to the notion of key predistribution. In this
approach, nodes are loaded with key information before deployment. This frees the require-
ment that the nodes must be in direct contact with the base station. After deployment,
each node communicates with its neighbor nodes and attempts to establish session keys.
We now describe several approaches to key predistribution for wireless sensor networks.
First, we present two naive approaches to key predistribution: using a global key and
using pairwise keys. For networks using the global key approach, every node is preloaded
with kglobal, the same key for each node. After deployment, each node can securely com-
municate with its neighbors using kglobal. However, with a single node compromise, all of
the secure communication links are compromised. Also, the adversary is able to success-
fully spoof any identity anywhere in the network. Conversely, the pairwise keys approach
presents a different design flaw. At first glance, this approach seems desirable in that each
key carries a key for each node (i.e. For vi it has kij ∀ vj ∈ V , where V is the set of all
possible nodes). A node is able to establish a secure link with every node, but the memory
burden is costly for these resource-constrained nodes since they must carry n− 1 keys.
We consider several other key predistribution schemes that rely on probabilistic tech-
niques to establish keys. Several schemes with different approaches exist [13, 26, 29, 32, 33,
35, 60, 61]. After deployment of these networks, each node is able to establish a pairwise
key and communicate securely only with nodes in its communication range and with whom
they share adequate key information as specified by the key predistribution scheme. This
probability that the two nodes are able to establish a secure link, is defined as pk. We
briefly describe two key predistribution methods, the first proposed scheme and one based
on multivariate symmetric polynomials.
Eschenauer and Gligor [35] provide one of the original works on key predistribution
schemes for sensor networks. These schemes assume a limited storage ability on each de-
ployed sensor in the network; therefore, they randomly assign a set number of keys m in
each node from a key pool of P keys. Two nodes are able to establish a secure link if they
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are within another node’s communication radius and share a common key. Chan et al.
[13] follow up on this scheme to propose a q-composite scheme where q keys are required
to establish a link. They derive an expression for the probability that two nodes share i
common keys. In this expression, two nodes are randomly given m keys from a key pool of
P keys and share i keys with probability
P (i) =
(
P
i
)(
P−i
2(m−i)
)(
2(m−i)
m−i
)
(
P
m
)2 . (2.8)
In this scheme, two arbitrary nodes are able to establish a secure link with probability
pk, given by
pk(qcomp) =
m∑
i=q
P (i). (2.9)
In this thesis, we identify terms such as pk(qcomp) by abbreviating this scheme by qcomp.
We define an instance of a q-composite network by qcomp(n, q,m, P ), which is a unique
instance. We also define the base scheme to be qcomp where q = 1, and it can be uniquely
described by base(n,m, P ).
Peer Intermediaries for Key Establishment (PIKE) is a proposed key predistribution
scheme [12] where node identities are organized in a square grid, where the node identities
are represented by coordinate grid points. Each node prior to deployment is loaded with a
secret pairwise key with each node that is found in the same row or column of the grid. After
deployment, neighboring nodes that do not share a pairwise key are able to use intermediate
nodes to establish pairwise keys.
Delgosha [26] proposes a key predistribution scheme based on multivariate symmetric
polynomials. Here, each node is given a coordinate in an d-dimensional space, (i1, . . . id).
Let I(j) be the set (i1, . . . id) minus the jth variable. Each i1, · · · idǫ[1,m], where s = ⌈ d
√
n⌉.
There are sd symmetric polynomials generated, fsid(x1, . . . xb), one for each enumerated
combination of d, s. Based on its identity, the nodes use the associated polynomials. Prior
to deployment, each node is loaded with d single variable polynomials, each calculated
by evaluating the polynomials corresponding to the value in each dimension in all but
one variable. For example, for the node I = (i1, . . . id), it is given f
1
i1
(x1, i2, . . . id), . . .,
fsid(xd, i2, . . . id−1). These are considered to be the key shares of node I. Nodes are able
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to establish a secure link with one of its neighbors if their node identities are of Hamming
distance of 1 (two nodes IDs differ in only one index). The two nodes are able to establish
a shared key by evaluating each key share polynomial at the variable where they differ
and combining the d evaluated key shares into a final pairwise key. One can see that the
probability that two nodes are Hamming distance 1 from each other, thus being able to
create a secure link, is
pk(mkps) =
(s− 1)d
sd
. (2.10)
In this work, we identify terms such as pk(mkps) by abbreviating this scheme with a mkps
tag. In this work, we define an instance of a network employing the multivariate symmetric
polynomial key predistribution scheme by mkps(n, d, t), which is a unique instance.
The probability of link failure is evaluated, which is stated to be the ability of the
adversary to compromise enough nodes to obtain enough shares of every polynomial. The
number of required shares to recover d polynomial coefficients is λ(d, t) =
(
t+r
r
)
in the case
of degree t polynomials, where r = d − 1. The probability of a link compromise, pℓ, is
defined to be
pℓ(mkps) = p
d−1
pr (2.11)
where each of the d − 1 common shared polynomials is recovered by the adversary. The
expression for the probability of a polynomial recovery, ppr, is
ppr =
sr∑
i=λ(r,t)
(
sr
i
)
pic(1− pc)s
r−i. (2.12)
2.3.2 Attacks on wireless sensor networks
In terms of the malicious behavior expected from the adversarial influences on these net-
works, the nature of the deployment of the networks assumes a scenario that is lacking in
physical security. In this way, the adversary has many possibilities to attack the network.
Karlof et al. [52] present several attack models on the routing of sensor networks, including
two types of attackers the node-class and laptop-class attackers. The difference of these
attack models are in the capabilities of the adversary, which are as follows.
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1. Node-class attacker: The node-level attacker has the same ability as one of the nodes.
The attacker has the same limitations of the regularly functioning node. Its transmis-
sion range, processing capability and available energy are all limited.
2. Laptop-class attacker: The laptop-class attacker has access to a high bandwidth net-
work, a more powerful transmitter/receiver, unlimited battery life, increased compu-
tational ability, and perhaps boundless physical searching capability.
In this thesis, we examine attacks on the network in the form of node compromises.
With these nodes and the information accumulated from these nodes, the adversary is able
to launch a variety of malicious attacks. The capability of the adversary determines the
potential strength of the threat posed to the network. This thesis considers link-compromise
attacks and node-spoofing attacks as a result of node-compromise attacks. With compro-
mised nodes and spoofed nodes, the adversary can carry out various malicious activities.
Of these malicious activities, the adversary may be able to carry out relatively simple
attacks such as eavesdropping on communications, replaying any transmissions, and per-
haps modifying information and retransmitting packets. There are also some rather severe
attacks such as the wormhole, sinkhole and Sybil attacks, which require nodes to be spoofed
to carry these attacks out. Other works consider specific attacks on networks; Parno con-
siders defenses against node replication attacks [75]. The case where compromised nodes
are spoofed into multiple legitimate node identities, known as the Sybil attack, is consid-
ered in [30, 71]. Others attempt to prevent sink hole and wormhole attacks using various
approaches [78, 83]. Several works attempt to detect misbehaving of failed nodes in the
network with different approaches [50, 64, 93]. There have been other proposed platforms
to provide general security services to wireless sensor networks [11, 51, 76, 102]
The attack model that is assumed in many cases, primarily in the case of key manage-
ment schemes, is that the compromise of a node reveals to all the key information within
that node. If the adversary has all keys used to established a secure link in the network
it is considered to be compromised. The enemy would be able to decrypt any of these
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messages being transmitted without any physical access to either of the nodes in commu-
nication. While worst-case scenario design in terms of expected adversary may provide
the best capable security measures, it is important to identify the relationship between
providing security versus other network parameters.
2.3.3 Properties of wireless sensor networks
This section introduces several properties of wireless networks, all of which have foundations
in traditional wired or wireless networks. We consider connectivity, latency and capacity
for wireless networks along with routing protocols and medium access protocols.
The analysis of properties of wireless networks begins with studies in random graphs
[9, 27]. Gupta and Kumar [43, 44, 99] derive capacity and connectivity results on the
asymptotic large-scale random graph G(n, p), where n is the size of the network and p is the
probability of establishing a link. However, Pishro-nik [79] proposes a random graph model
for use with wireless networks in G(n, r, f, pe, psf ), which considers a finite communication
radius and unreliable links and sensors. In these random graphs, f is the distribution of
the nodes, pe is the probability of link error and psf is the probability of sensor failure. An
expression for required communication radius for G(n, psf , f, pe) is
lim
n→∞
r(n) ≥
√
ln(n)
πnpe(n)fminpsf (n)
. (2.13)
The required communication range is shown to be a sharp threshold for connectivity
and k-connectivity for large networks. Given the network parameters, any r(n) below the
threshold will be not connected with high probability, and any r(n) above the threshold
will produce a network that is connected with high probability.
There have been studies of other properties of wireless sensor networks to facilitate
the flow of packets in the network. Routing within sensor networks has been a significant
area of interest as the traditional routing protocols assume an internet-protocol (IP) based
architecture [2], which is not viable in sensor networks. Given a multi-hop networking
environment along with resource-constrained devices, several different approaches emerge.
Heinzelman introduced a clustering [45, 46] approach where nodes become clusterhead nodes
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throughout the operation of the network. Other proposed similar hierarchical routing pro-
tocols [59, 62, 63], This approach distributes the energy usage so that only a small subset
of the nodes are required to transmit with higher power to reach the base station. Also
introduced were directed diffusion [47, 48] approaches to routing protocols, which has each
node find the node to forward its packets through based on maximizing some global net-
work metric. Also, routing in sensor networks can be achieved with geographic metrics
[53, 57, 72, 84, 88, 90, 103] using position information. Medium access control (MAC) pro-
tocols in wireless sensor networks have had to deal with the limited communication range
of the network in addition to the lack of clock synchronization in the network [82, 92, 100].
These network services are used in our analysis of the performance of sensor networks.
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PART I
Link Security
CHAPTER III
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF WAVELET-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY
3.1 Introduction
As stated in the introduction, we are investigating data-encryption techniques for wireless
hand-held devices. While these devices, such as mobile phones, will play a pivotal role in
electronic-commerce applications by delivering a range of services anywhere and anytime,
they are vulnerable to malicious attacks. Any cellular transmission or conversation is vul-
nerable because of the wireless transmission medium. Attackers are able to eavesdrop on
conversations, steal private data or even pretend to be a legitimate user. If there exists a
constant paranoia of insecure communications, users will not be willing to use such tech-
nologies. In this chapter, we examine the security and performance of a new cryptosystem
based on the finite-field wavelet, which is proposed for use with hand-held devices.
Finite-alphabet processing plays a key role in coding for security. For many years, work
on Fourier transforms has had impact on cryptography. For example, several cryptographic
analyses have used the discrete-Fourier transform and the Walsh transform [42, 65, 66, 87].
Like the Fourier transform, which has found widespread applications in cryptography, Fekri
has proposed to employ finite-field wavelets as elementary building blocks for the construc-
tion of cryptographic primitives. Work attributed to Fekri has shown that processing based
on a newly developed theory of wavelet transforms over finite-fields provides a framework
for new approaches to cryptography. This new theory provides a general wavelet decompo-
sition of sequences defined over finite fields [37, 38, 39, 40, 41]. This is an approach that
has a rich history in signal processing for the representation of real-valued signals, but not
as prominent in the case of finite-fields. One of the interesting properties of the finite-field
wavelet is that it transforms the input message into a form that is very difficult to recover
without knowledge of the basis functions.
The motivation behind developing a data encryption technique is to provide an algorithm
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for wireless hand-held devices with several properties. This scheme needs to have an efficient
implementation, particularly in hardware, as hand-held devices cannot afford complicated
hardware. If these algorithms can be implemented on a digital signal processor (DSP), this
makes it suitable for use in mobile devices such as cellular phones, digital cameras, and
digital camcorders. In addition, we require a flexible design that allows the variation of
the key size and also for use in different modes of operation without changing the hardware
architecture. Having a simple yet flexible design facilitates the analysis and implementation.
Additionally, we require a cryptosystem that is secure against cryptanalytic attacks.
We estimate that the wavelet cryptosystem with key size of 128 runs as fast as AES
with key size 128 in software. Our cryptanalytic work suggests that the wavelet cryp-
tosystem remains unbroken against all the known cryptanalytic attacks. Additionally, since
wavelets are implemented by digital filters, its execution times are optimized when realized
in hardware. In this chapter, we first present a background of the wavelet transform and
its adaptation to provide elementary encryption and decryption blocks. From these ele-
mentary blocks comes the wavelet block cipher (WBC). These developments with regard
to the theory of the finite-field wavelet and their application to cryptography are due to
Fekri. This thesis introduces the structure and theory of the wavelet cryptosystem; how-
ever, its main contribution is the cryptanalysis of WBC. We analyze the security of the
wavelet block cipher by considering cryptanalytic attacks on WBC. Since WBC possesses
a strong mathematical structure, we consider algebraic attacks on this cryptosystem. Last,
we compare its computational complexity against other widely-used cryptosystems.
3.2 Wavelet structure for encryption and decryption
This section describes the wavelet-based cryptosystem previously proposed by Fekri. An
interesting property of the finite-field wavelet is that it transforms the input data to a
sequence similar to white noise. More precisely, finite-field wavelets have a decorrelating
property. Consider Figure 3.1 where we process an image which has amplitudes ranging
from 0 to 255. We can treat this image as a two-dimensional signal in GF(256). We designed
a separable two-dimensional filter bank by cascading two one-dimensional orthogonal filter
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banks of filter length eight over the field GF(256). In a separable two-dimensional wavelet
analysis of a two-dimensional signal, the rows and columns of the two-dimensional signal
are analyzed separately. In other words, two sets of one-dimensional basis functions are
used to represent rows and columns of the two-dimensional signal independently. By this
method, the two-dimensional data (signal) is first encoded row-wise and then the resulting
data is encoded again column-wise. As it is illustrated in Figure 3.1, the input data is
transformed into four sub-sequences that are similar to white noise. This was experimentally
observed on several natural images during the development of the finite-field wavelet theory.
It is important to note that the finite-field wavelets are quite different from their real-field
counterparts. If we used real-field wavelets on the image, we would have had sub-images that
contain lowpass and highpass information of the original image. The original image can be
perfectly reconstructed by using the finite-field inverse wavelet counterpart. Additionally,
as Figure 3.1 may not imply, it is possible to compress the image with any compression
method and then treat the compressed output as the input to the encryption algorithm.
Figure 3.1 only illustrates the decorrelating property of the finite-field wavelet transform.
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ho(n)h1(n)
h1(n)
h1(n)
↓ 2
↓ 2 ↓ 2
↓ 2
↓ 2
↓ 2
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HL HH
Figure 3.1: Wavelet decomposition of Lenna’s image by a two-stage, two-band, orthogonal
filter bank over GF(256).
In addition to this decorrelating property of finite-field wavelets, there are two key prop-
erties that are exploited to construct an encryption system where both end users participate
in the determination of the key. First, there is a high degree of non-linearity in the wavelet
structure by using the lifting scheme. Second, the symmetric property of the polyphase
filters are exploited by the transmitter and receiver to construct a shared key. The encryp-
tion and decryption are performed by the synthesis and analysis banks of the nonlinear
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finite-field wavelet transform, respectively. The wavelet system is determined by the se-
cret and public keys of the users. The security depends on the length of the wavelet basis
function and the nonlinearity within the wavelet transform, which operate over GF(256).
The wavelet-based cryptosystem can operate in either stream-cipher [24, 25] or block-cipher
[16, 17] modes depending on whether the filter banks perform linear or circular convolution.
In this thesis, we study the wavelet-based block cipher. In the following section, we give
the details of the wavelet cryptosystem.
3.2.1 Linear blocks of the wavelet cryptosystem
The wavelet system is implemented using a two-band analysis-synthesis filter bank. The
analysis and synthesis banks of a two-channel perfect reconstruction filter bank in which the
synthesis filters g0(n) and g1(n) are the scaling sequence and mother wavelet of lengths N ,
respectively. More specifically, the analysis bank performs the wavelet transform and the
synthesis bank performs the inverse wavelet transform. The blocks labelled [↓ 2] downsample
by a factor of two by taking every other sample, and those labelled [↑ 2] increase the sampling
rate by a factor of two by inserting one sample with value zero between each pair of samples
in the input sequence. The sequences labelled y0(n), y1(n) are the wavelet coefficients. The
impulse responses of the digital filters must be related if the synthesis section is to invert
the results of the analysis. In this chapter, we study block ciphers of length N = 2M .
Similar to the wavelet error control coding, the inverse wavelet transform is used for
transmitting (encryption) the message and the wavelet transform is used for receiving (de-
cryption). Figure 3.2 shows the elementary block that is used for the encryption. We refer
to this block as an elementary encryption block. This elementary encryption block utilizes
the inverse wavelet transform together with a demultiplexer that splits the input signal
x(n) into even index x0(n) and odd index x1(n) sequences. The symmetric property of the
polyphase filters is exploited to enable the use of the polyphase representation [37, 38] of
multi-rate filters to further simplify the structure of the encryption block into Figure 3.3. In
this representation e00(n) is the even index polyphase components of the filter g0(n). This
polyphase filter e00(n) can be any symmetric sequence of length M , where M is an odd
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number that is determined by the key length in the cryptosystem. This simplification also
reduces the number of operations by a factor of four because the length of the polyphase
filter e00(n) is half of the length of the filter g0(n). In summary, the elementary encryption
block maps the sequence x(n) by a one-to-one mapping to the sequence y(n).
x(n) x0(n)
x1(n)
y(n)
g0(n)
g1(n)
↓ 2
↓ 2 ↑ 2
↑ 2
z1
Inverse Wavelet
Figure 3.2: Multirate filter implementation of the elementary encryption block (EB).
x(n) x0(n)
x1(n)
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↑ 2
↑ 2
↑ 2
z−1
z−1
z1
z−
M−1
2
z−
M−1
2
Figure 3.3: Polyphase representation of the encryption block in fields of characteristic
two.
The mapping that is performed by the encryption block (EB) is a linear and bijective
transformation. By the property of the wavelet system, one can easily show that x(n)
can be extracted from y(n) by using the inverse system that is shown in Figure 3.4. We
refer to this inverse system as a decryption block. The decryption block consists of the
wavelet transform associated with the inverse wavelet transform in the encryption block
and a multiplexer that interleaves and combines the even and odd indexes to get x(n).
Similar to the encryption block, the decryption block defined over the field GF(2r) can be
simplified to Figure 3.5 if it is represented by the symmetric polyphase component e00(n)
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of the filter g0(n).
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Figure 3.4: Multirate filter implementation of the elementary decryption block (DB).
x(n)
x1(n)
x0(n)y(n)
e00(n)
↓ 2
↓ 2
↑ 2
↑ 2
z1
z1 z−
M−1
2
z−
M−1
2
z2
Figure 3.5: Polyphase representation of the decryption block in fields of characteristic
two.
Figures 3.2 and 3.4 represent the basic blocks for encryption and decryption, respectively.
Therefore, to determine both the encryption and decryption blocks, it is sufficient that we
pick any arbitrary symmetric sequence e00(n) of lengthM , whereM is any odd number. The
output y of the wavelet transform can be represented with matrix operations as a function
of x(n) and the secret coefficients, e00(n). These derivations are detailed in Appendix A.
Using (2.4), it can be shown from Figure 3.2 that the input and output relation of the
elementary encryption block can be written as
y = (G0A+G1B)x, (3.1)
where the input and output are represented by two vectors x and y, respectively. Using
the polyphase representation of the wavelet transform, the input and output relation of the
elementary encryption block in Figure 3.3 can be written by
Y = (DE00A+ CE00B + C(E00 + S)A+D(E00 + S)B)x (3.2)
Y = Tx. (3.3)
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We represent the elementary encryption block by the matrix T . Similar matrix represen-
tation exists for the decryption block of Figure 3.5. We represent the decryption block by
the matrix, F , for the remainder of this chapter. The matrices A, B, C, D, E, and S used
in (3.1) and (3.2) are defined in Appendix A.
3.2.2 Nonlinear blocks of the wavelet cryptosystem
This section describes how the nonlinearity is added into the wavelet transform. Since
the original wavelet system is linear, it is necessary to construct a nonlinear wavelet to
make the system resistant against cryptanalytic attacks. This can be done by the lifting
method. As shown in Figure 3.6, the nonlinearity in the encryption block is introduced by
a implementing a feedback system that takes the output block y of the wavelet system, and
after delaying by one block, it passes through a nonlinear operation and adds the result to
the incoming message block (plaintext) x. The nonlinear operation is a mapping of every
nonzero element of the block vector y(n −N) (note that the delay is a block delay) to its
inverse in GF(256). If the block vector y(n − N) contains a zero element, we simply map
the element to zero because a zero element does not have any inverse in GF(256). One can
easily show that the nonlinear decryption block associated with the nonlinear encryption
block is given by a feed-forward system as shown in Figure 3.7.
x(n) y(n)x0(n)
x1(n)
g0(n)
g1(n)↓ 2
↓ 2
↑ 2
↑ 2
z1
z−N
NL
Inverse Wavelet
Figure 3.6: Elementary nonlinear encryption block (NLEB).
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x(n)x1(n)
x0(n)
y(n)
h0(n)
h1(n)
↓ 2
↓ 2 ↑ 2
↑ 2
z1
z−N
NL
Wavelet Transform
Figure 3.7: Elementary nonlinear decryption block (NLDB).
3.3 Two-round wavelet cryptosystem
3.3.1 General structure of WBC
This section presents the overall proposed block cipher variation of the wavelet cryptosys-
tem, the wavelet block cipher (WBC). As shown in Figures 3.8 and 3.9, the wavelet encryp-
tion system consists of two rounds. As we will realize later, two rounds will result in the
total key size of 128 bits. Based on the application, the number of rounds can be increased
to reach a higher security level. These rounds are identical except for that the filters in each
round are different from one another. Each round consists of two elementary blocks. The
first one is the nonlinear encryption block (NLEB) that is implemented by the polyphase
representation form that we discussed earlier. The second block is the linear encryption
block (EB), which is also realized by the polyphase representation. Each elementary block
consists of a polyphase filter of length M = 15 that operates over the finite-field GF(256).
As we discussed earlier, the polyphase filter coefficients are the secret key (unknown for
the adversary) in the wavelet cryptosystem. Since the polyphase filter is symmetric, the
actual length of the key is eight coefficients in GF(256), or equivalently 64 bits. Therefore,
each round of the wavelet encryption system has a key size of 128 bits. Note that the
effective key size of the two-round wavelet is still 128 bits. This is because the key for the
second round is obtained by the same 128-bit key of the first round by a (publicly known)
bitwise permutation of the coefficients. Figure 3.9 shows the wavelet decryption system
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which consists of two rounds as in the encryption system. Each round inverts the operation
of the corresponding round of the encryption system. Similar to the encryption blocks of
the wavelet encryption system, the decryption blocks of the wavelet decryption system are
implemented by the polyphase form that we have already explained. Based on the filter
length that is used, in the block cipher case, the length of the message block is N = 30
symbols in GF(256), or equivalently 240 bits. Notice that the number of operations that are
required by the convolution of the encryption and decryption process can be significantly
reduced by using finite-field FFT or an appropriate bilinear cyclic convolution transform
that was developed in [74].
CiphertextPlaintext
EBEB NLEBNLEB
Round 1, 128 bit key Round 2
length 15length 15
Figure 3.8: The wavelet encryption system
Since the input is processed block-by-block in the block cipher mode, the nonlinear
part of the wavelet cryptosystem that contains feedback also operates in a vector (block) by
vector (block) form. This implies that we buffer the output of the feedback system for every
block of 30 symbols. The block of the feedback output will be added to the next message
block that is going to be encrypted. In other words, the present feedback output does not
affect the encryption of the current message. Instead, the current message is added to the
feedback output (240 bits) resulting from the encryption of the previous message block.
Ciphertext Plaintext
NLDB NLDBDBDB
Inverse of Round 2 Inverse of Round 1
length 15length 15
Figure 3.9: The wavelet decryption system.
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Every time the system starts the encryption process, the polyphase filters in the en-
cryption blocks are started from the zero initial states. For higher security, we may assume
that a random initial sequence of the input block size is added to the plaintext whenever
the system starts the encryption. Since we do not want to transmit this random vector to
the receiver, the first block of the encrypted message will not be recoverable by the receiver
and it should be disregarded. However, the subsequent blocks will be correctly recovered
by the receiver without requiring a knowledge about the random initial sequence.
In Section 3.2.1, the polyphase representation of the elementary encryption and decryp-
tion blocks is shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.5. The encryption has two convolution operations,
while the decryption only has one. Because of this structure in the proposed wavelet cryp-
tosystem, the decryption is almost two times faster (and less complex) than the encryption.
The polyphase representation of the elementary encryption and decryption blocks is shown
in Figures 3.3 and 3.5. The encryption has one more convolution operation, which is the
most computationally intensive operation in the algorithm, than the decryption.
In this way, the decryption for the wavelet cryptosystem is almost two times faster (and
less complex) than the encryption, so exchanging the role of the transmitter and receiver
may fit some applications, where the computational load is higher in the transmitter. This
can be done by exchanging the role of the wavelet transform (analysis bank) and the inverse
wavelet (synthesis bank). In other words, as shown in Figures 3.10 and 3.11, the wavelet
transform is used in the elementary encryption block and the inverse wavelet transform
is used for the basic decryption block. Figures 3.10 and 3.11 shows the structure of the
nonlinear encryption and decryption blocks when we exchange the roles of the wavelet and
the inverse wavelet. A similar change can be applied for the linear encryption and decryption
blocks used in the wavelet cryptosystem shown in Figures 3.8 and 3.9.
3.3.2 Key generation for WBC
This section describes the key exchange between two parties, say Alice and Bob, so that
they end up establishing the same filters in a secure manner. We are going to describe two
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x(n) y(n)x0(n)
x1(n)
h0(n)
h1(n) ↓ 2
↓ 2
↑ 2
↑ 2
z−1
z−N
NL
Wavelet Transform
Figure 3.10: Nonlinear transform block constructed by the wavelet transform (NLEB).
x(n)y(n) x0(n)
x1(n)
g0(n)
g1(n)↓ 2
↓ 2
↑ 2
↑ 2
z1
z−N
NL
Inverse Wavelet
Figure 3.11: Nonlinear inverse transform block constructed by the inverse wavelet trans-
form (NLDB).
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different methods based on the two methods of the filter generations. Note that we only
need to generate the 128 bit key (16 symbols in GF(256)) of the first round. The coefficients
of the second round are obtained by the permutation of these bits. This permutation is
public knowledge. As an example, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange [28] protocol can be
used to setup the filter coefficients, yet it is possible to employ any public key exchange
protocol. In an encryption system using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, Alice (user A)
sends an invoice to Bob (user B), encrypting it via her secret key and user Bob’s public key.
Bob then uses his private key and Alice’s public key to decrypt the transmitted document.
In the symmetric case, only (M + 1)/2 key symbols must be exchanged, whereas for the
nonsymmetric case, M exchanges must be done.
3.3.2.1 Symmetric Polyphase Filters
In the two-round wavelet cryptosystem, the key exchange protocol must ensure the same
polyphase filters e
(1)
oo (n) and e
(2)
oo (n) for both encryption and decryption. Here, the filters
e
(1)
oo (n) and e
(2)
oo (n) are the even index polyphase components of the nonlinear encryption
block and the linear encryption block of the first round, respectively. Therefore, two sym-
metric filters e
(1)
oo (n) and e
(2)
oo (n) are securely generated by a method relying on the security
of the discrete log problem (DLP) over finite-fields.
Alice and Bob each independently choose a symmetric sequence of length M as their
secret key, where M is an odd positive integer. In the symmetric case, (M + 1)/2 key
symbols will be exchanged. Let the symmetric sequence {k0, . . . , kM−1} be the secret key
of Alice. Also let the symmetric sequence {v0, . . . , vM−1} be the secret key of Bob. If the
Diffie-Hellman key exchange is used, the resulting shared key will be {αk0v00 , . . . , αkM−1vM−1M−1 },
using the discrete log function over a cyclic group Z∗p, where p is a large prime and such
that the DLP is intractable over Z∗p, and α is the generator of Z
∗
p.
3.3.2.2 Nonsymmetric polyphase filters
The filter banks used in WBC employ symmetric polyphase filters. This symmetric prop-
erty is useful to simplify the polyphase implementation of the filter banks and reduces
the number of additions and multiplications that are required by the wavelet cryptosystem.
40
However, the symmetric structure of the polyphase filters may reduce the strength of the se-
curity for the wavelet cryptosystem. Therefore, as an alternative to the symmetric method,
we introduce a second method that eliminate this concern at the cost of quadruple the com-
putational complexity in the decryption block (the computational complexity is doubled for
the encryption block). It is very important to note that the polyphase representation of the
two-band filter banks as shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.5 is valid only if symmetric polyphase
filters are used. The general well-known polyphase representation (that is introduced for
real/complex fields) should be used with the nonsymmetric method. It is known that every
filter bank has a polyphase matrix representation. Two types of building blocks, D(z) and
S(z), are necessary and sufficient building blocks to construct all the two-band filter banks
[40]. In the following, these building blocks are described.
Dv(z) is the degree-one PU building block defined by:
D(z) = d(0) + z−1d(1) = I + ℓ−1v vv
T + z−1ℓ−1v vv
T , where : ℓv = v
T v 6= 0. (3.4)
Note that for two-band filter banks v = [a b]T is a vector of length two in GF (2r) and ℓv is
always square. The nonzero condition of ℓv requires that a 6= b.
A degree 2τ elementary building block has the following structure:
Sτ,ζ(z) = ζ(I + J) + z
−τI + z−2τζ(I + J), (3.5)
where ζ 6= 0 is a scalar in GF (2r) and τ is any positive integer. Here, I and J are the
identity and exchange matrices, respectively. Thus, I + J =
[
1 1
1 1
]
.
To generate 16 symbols key that are shared by the transmitter and receiver, again the
key exchange protocol using the discrete log problem (DLP) can be used. The generation
the polyphase filters once the 16 shared key coefficients are established is described. Since
the first round consists of two sets of two-band filter banks, thus each filter banks uses
eight key symbols to specify their filter coefficients. This implies that the polyphase matrix
should have the following form E(z) = Dv1(z)S2,ζ1(z)Dv2(z)S2,ζ2(z)Dv3(z) where the scalars
ζ1, ζ2 and the vectors v1, v2, v3 satisfy the criterion that was described previously. Each
vector v is specified by two key coefficients and each ζ is determined by one key coefficient.
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Therefore, the total key usage to specify the polyphase matrix is 8. By this description,
the lengths of the polyphase filters are equal to 8 as opposed to the symmetric polyphase
method for which we need length 15 polyphase filters for each two-band filter banks. Since
the length 15 convolution can be performed more efficiently than length 8 convolution in
GF(256), we may increase the length of the polyphase filters to 15. This can be done by
using for example E(z) = Dv1(z
2)S2,ζ1(z
2)Dv2(z
2)S2,ζ2(z
2)Dv3(z
2). However, the security
of the system benefits from the use of E(z) = Dv1(z)
[∏4
i=1 S2,ζi(z)Dvi+1
]
Dv6(z). This way,
the resulting polyphase filter has length 15, but the key size is doubled. In other words,
with the same computational cost of the encryption and decryption, the key size becomes
256 instead of 128 bits.
3.3.2.3 Key schedule
As discussed, the filter coefficients of the first round of the wavelet cryptosystem, e
(1)
00 and
e
(2)
00 are defined by using the 16 key symbols. The filter coefficients of the second round, e
(3)
00
and e
(4)
00 , are obtained by some permutation on the original 128 key bits. Our cryptanalysis
in Section 3.4.5 suggests that to prevent the DFT attack, a bitwise permutation within a
symbol of e
(i)
00 (n) should be used to obtain the corresponding symbol in e
(i+2)
00 for i = 1, 2.
In other words, the jth coefficient of e
(3)
00 (n) is constructed by eight bit permutations of the
jth coefficient of e
(1)
00 (n). Therefore, only one 8-bit permutation is necessary for the system.
As a remark, this chapter only considers the two-band wavelet (i.e., two-channel filter
bank) over finite fields to construct the wavelet cryptosystem. Multi-band wavelets (i.e.,
multi-channel filter banks) are the generalization of the two-band wavelets. The analysis
and synthesis of a multi-channel filter bank is illustrated in Figure 3.12. The theory that
describes how to construct multi-channel filter banks over fields of characteristic two is
presented in [39, 40, 37]. The wavelet cryptosystem can also be constructed by multi-band
wavelets (i.e., multi-channel filter banks). To explain this, consider the nonlinear transform
and inverse transform blocks shown by Figure 3.6. We replace the inverse wavelet (synthesis
bank) of the two-band system shown in Figure 3.6 with the inverse wavelet (synthesis bank)
of the L-band system shown in Figure 3.12. Similarly, the wavelet transform (analysis bank)
42
of the two-band system shown in Figure 3.7 can be replaced with the wavelet transform
(analysis bank) of the L-band system. Additionally, we split the message sequence x(n)
into L subsequences as opposed to only two subsequences in Figures 3.6 and 3.7. In other
words, all the upsamplers and downsamplers by factor of two are replaced by the factor
L. These modifications are required to construct the elementary linear encryption and de-
cryption blocks in order to use L-channel filter banks instead of the two-channel filter banks.
x(n) xˆ(n)
h0(n) g0(n)
h1(n) g1(n)
hL−1(n) gL−1(n)↓ L
↓ L
↓ L ↑ L
↑ L
↑ L
Synthesis BankAnalysis Bank
Figure 3.12: L-channel maximally decimated filter bank
3.4 Cryptanalysis of WBC
We now consider the strength of security with regard to known cryptanalytic techniques and
also present some new cryptanalytic methods specific to the wavelet structure. We propose
some attacks on the reduced round wavelet cryptosystem as well as the best-known attack
on the full 2-round system. Currently, we have found no realizable attacks that threaten the
security of the wavelet cryptosystem. It is worthwhile to note that the structure of the one-
round encryption is similar to the cascade of cipher-block chaining and electronic codebook
(CBC|ECB) modes of operation. Therefore, their cryptanalytic methods constructed in
[4, 5] may present potential cryptanalytic methods for the wavelet algorithm. The difference
in the structure comes with the addition of the Inv function in the feedback branch. Also,
we note that the cryptographic primitive of wavelet cryptosystem has an inherent feedback
structure, much like the CBC mode of operation. Therefore, it is viable to use the wavelet
cryptosystem in any mode of operation, including ECB. However, in the encryption using
ECB (which in this case it actually has feedback), the first block is discarded and cannot
be decrypted because of the use of the random initial vector. This does not affect the
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analysis of the cryptanalytic attacks. This section first considers properties of WBC and
an approach to analyze WBC security. Second, we examine the vulnerabilities of WBC to
linear and differential attacks. Third, we consider algebraic attacks to take advantage of its
highly mathematical structure.
The wavelet decryption structure is illustrated in Figures 3.13 and 3.14 for one and two
rounds. These figures are simply the explicit declaration of Figure 3.8, where the function
NL is Inv and the T (i) and F (i) are matrix representations of the EB and DB blocks,
respectively. For the wavelet encryption, the feedback as shown in Figure 3.14 results in a
system that every ciphertext block is determined by the current plaintext block and each
previously encrypted ciphertext block. This impedes the ability to analyze the system since
every plaintext block after the system’s initial conditions must be considered. Therefore,
we choose to consider the wavelet decryption, or a chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) for
which the system is feedforward. Figures 3.15 and 3.16 show the unwrapped versions of
Figures 3.13 and 3.14, respectively. Each decrypted plaintext block is dependent on the
current ciphertext block and the two previous ciphertext blocks. All attempts at attacks
on the wavelet cryptosystem presented in subsequent sections will be CCA and according
to Figures 3.13 and 3.14.
For wavelet encryption, full diffusion is achieved rapidly as a result of the algorithm’s
structure, which holds a high dependence on the key. The effect of an input XOR difference
propagates quickly to each bit of the output. If one elementary wavelet encryption block
(Figure 3.2) is considered, the relationship between the input x and output y is given by
y = Tx, recalling that T contains all the key information, then every bit of C is dependent
on every value of P . Hence, the full diffusion property is satisfied, within one elementary
encryption block.
It must be noted that keys with many elements equal to zero do not possess such
properties and should not be used. The weak key is noticed by observing Figure 3.16 and
the delta attack described in Section 3.4.4. First, recall that F (2) and F (4) are generated by
permutations of the same key, e
(2)
oo (n). By tracking the C(M−2) branch, it can be shown that
the minimum number of nonzero elements of e
(2)
oo (n) must be five. This protects against
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having this branch to not be fully diffused. Furthermore, by observing the C(M) branch
along with the requirements for e
(2)
oo (n), it also can be shown that the minimum number of
nonzero elements of e
(1)
oo (n) (which generate F (1) and F (3)) is one. Therefore, ciphertexts
using keys not satisfying these conditions may not maintain the full diffusion property.
This amounts to one weak key out of every 7.2 × 1022 keys chosen. Keys satisfying these
conditions but still with some key symbols equal to zero may appear to be susceptible to
attacks shown in subsequent sections; however, no method has been found yet to exploit
this concept of taking advantage of the key not containing all nonzero elements.
CP
Inv
T (2)T (1)
z−N
(a) One-round wavelet encryption.
C P
Inv
F (2) F (1)
z−N
(b) One-round wavelet decryption.
Figure 3.13: The one-round wavelet system
CP
Inv Inv
T (2)T (1) T (4)T (3)
z−Nz−N
(a) Two-round wavelet encryption.
C P
InvInv
F (4) F (3) F (2) F (1)
z−N z−N
(b) Two-round wavelet decryption.
Figure 3.14: The two-round wavelet system
F (2)
F (2)
F (1)
Inv
C(m)
C(m−1)
P
Figure 3.15: Unwrapped decryption structure for one round
3.4.1 Resistance to linear and differential cryptanalysis
Linear and Differential attacks [6, 67] are two classical cryptanalytic attacks that have
exposed security vulnerabilities in many cryptographic algorithms. Therefore, it is necessary
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F (4)
F (4)
F (4)
F (4)
F (3)
F (3)
F (2)
F (2) F (1)
Inv
Inv
Inv
C(m)
C(m−1)
C(m−1)
C(m−2)
P
Figure 3.16: Unwrapped decryption structure for two rounds
to make sure that the wavelet algorithm is not susceptible to such attacks. The viability
of these attacks is based on the presence of strong characteristics. Occurring with certain
probability, a characteristic is a relationship of plaintext, ciphertext, and key bits that span
one or more rounds of the elementary round function. Attacks are formed by concatenating
these characteristics to establish a relationship between the plaintext, ciphertext, and key
bits of the full cryptographic algorithm. The linear and differential characteristics were
defined in Section 2.2.1.
Attacks (perhaps of reduced-round versions of an algorithm) are mounted by identifying
differentials that are only affected by a small subset of the blocks of plaintext, ciphertext
and key. For example, differential characteristics in DES are found such that only few
of the 8 S-boxes (per round) are involved. Indeed, there have been some sophisticated
improvements (last-round trick, symmetric characteristics) which have been shown to re-
duce the complexity of these attacks, but our justification considers the lack of the basic
characteristic needed of both the linear and differential attacks.
For the differential characteristic, it is important to note that the elementary wavelet en-
cryption block and the finite-field inverse nonlinear block are bijective mappings. Consider
the bijective function F , which is the elementary decryption block. For a differential charac-
teristic, we consider C, C ′ for a fixed C∗ and observe the distribution of P⊕P ′ = FC⊕FC ′.
It is easy to see that every value of P ⊕P ′ will occur 2N times; therefore every characteristic
for one block will have probability 2−N . Furthermore, every differential will be satisfied with
this probability. So, the differential attack using XOR as the differential is not possible.
For a linear characteristic, consider an elementary wavelet decryption block, x = Fy, and
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assume that there exists some correlation between symbols of a subset of bits of the plain-
text, ciphertext and key, namely {Pi1 · · ·Pim}, {Cj1 · · ·Cjn}, {Kr1 · · ·Krl}. The function F
can be represented by a matrix where each Fij depends on the key symbols. Therefore,
according to the definition of the characteristic,
Pi1 + · · ·+ Pim = Cj1 + · · ·+ Cjn +Kr1 + · · ·+Krl (3.6)
we have,
F11C1 + · · ·+ F1NCN + · · ·+ Fim1C1 + · · ·+ FimNCN = C1 + · · ·+ Cn +K1 + · · ·+Kℓ(3.7)
For an arbitrary choice of key, which in this case means the arbitrary selection of all Fij
and Ki, (3.7) and the full diffusion property discourages the possibility for the characteristic
to hold with high probability. We have not found any characteristics that potentially
challenge the security of the algorithm in this fashion. This demonstrates the high key
dependency and rapid rate of full diffusion thats leads to a lack of linear characteristics
for the elementary wavelet blocks. Because of this property, strong linear and differential
characteristics that pose any serious threats to the wavelet algorithm do not exist. In the
following sections, we try to exploit the feed-forward structure in the decryption of the
two-round wavelet cryptosystem to find new types of attacks.
3.4.2 Divide-and-conquer linear attack on the one-round WBC
This section presents chosen ciphertext attacks on the wavelet algorithm. By unwrapping
the feed-forward structure of the wavelet decryption as in Figure 3.15 and 3.16, we will
consider sets of ciphertext blocks to produce a single decrypted plaintext block. Denote
this set C = [ C(m) C(m−1) . . . ]. Here, an attack considers ciphertexts in sets of two for
one-round attacks and three for the two-round attacks. Perhaps there exist more fortuitous
choices of these ciphertexts, but for now, this approach will suffice.
First of all, it is obvious that with N linearly independent observations of the input
and their corresponding output of a linear elementary decryption block, its individual key
values can be determined. So, attempting to exploit the wavelet decryption structure to
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reduce the problem of analyzing nonlinear wavelet decryption blocks to analyzing the linear
variety is the first approach taken.
The key for the one-round wavelet system can be recovered by choosing C = [ C(m)
C(m−1) ] = [ 0 x ], where x is any non-zero vector of length N. The key bits within F (2) are
obtained choosing C = [ 0 x ] to obtain Inv(P) = F (2)x. Therefore, by choosing N linearly
independent ciphertext blocks, X = [x1 · · ·xn], we can obtain F (2) from F (2) = Inv(P)X−1.
Now, F (1) is determined by choosingC = [ x 0 ] to obtain the relationP = F (2)(F (1)(x)).
Therefore F (1) can also be obtained by choosing N linearly independent ciphertext blocks,
x. Thus, this attack requires at most 2N chosen ciphertexts.
Note that a similar CCA technique is not applicable to the two-round wavelet cryptosys-
tem due to the second feedforward branch and associated nonlinear device in the decryption
structure which define the output from the input. The next several sections are devoted
to attempts at other approaches to find an attack with a lower computational complexity
than the previously stated method.
3.4.3 Analysis of the interpolation attack
In this section, we describe a variation of the interpolation attack [49] that exploits the
algebraic structure of the wavelet cryptosystem. The approach of this chosen ciphertext
attack is to characterize the plaintext as a function of a rational polynomial of the ciphertext
symbols and solve these as a linear system of equations. This provides the attacker with
the ability of ciphertext decryption; however, the attacker does not recover the key.
The order of complexity is determined by the number of coefficients in the polynomial.
Also observe that the wavelet algorithm has a key space of 128 bits. Therefore, an attack is
effective if its complexity is less than O(2128). Throughout the interpolation attack section,
we will consider one index (without loss of generality, the first index) of the plaintext for
clarity. Therefore, the total complexity of the computation for the entire plaintext block is
increased by a factor of N relative to the number of coefficients that characterize a single
index.
One index of the matrix-vector multiplication for an elementary wavelet linear wavelet
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block is represented by P =
N∑
k=1
F1kCk. For one elementary decryption block, each plaintext
symbol is represented by a polynomial with N terms. Thus, N linearly independent cipher-
texts are required to completely determine the system. This is the basis for the remainder
of the sections that consider the interpolation attack. We also abuse the notation for 1
x
. By
this, we mean Inv(x), which is the index by index mapping of the vector x to its inverse
element in GF(256).
We establish this fact for use when considering rational expressions of polynomials. Let
L and M be two elementary decryption blocks and C be the ciphertext block. This fact
counts the number of coefficients of P = L(Inv(MC)).
Fact 1. L( 1
MC
) results in a polynomial with NN+1 unknown terms.
Proof.
L


1
N∑
k=1
M1kCk
...
1
N∑
k=1
MNkCk


=


L11
N∑
k=1
M1kCk
+ · · ·+ L1N
N∑
k=1
MNkCk
...
LN1
N∑
k=1
M1kCk
+ · · ·+ LNN
N∑
k=1
MNkCk


=


N∑
h=1
L1h
N∏
j 6=h
N∑
i=1
MjiCi
N∏
k=1
N∑
i=1
MjiCi
...
N∑
h=1
LNh
N∏
j 6=h
N∑
i=1
MjiCi
N∏
k=1
N∑
i=1
MjiCi


(3.8)
Altogether, there are NN coefficients in both the numerator and the denominator, so
there are NN+1 unknowns in total to characterize P.
3.4.3.1 Interpolation Attack of the One-Round Wavelet Decryption
This section presents the attacks for the wavelet algorithm; in this case, the one round
system. Using Figure 3.15, the attacker can characterize one round of the wavelet decryption
by
P = F (12)C(m) +
1
F (2)C(m−1)
(3.9)
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Therefore, one symbol of the plaintext is given by
[
Pm1
]
=


N∑
k=1
F
(12)
1k C
(m)
k
N∑
j=1
F
(1)
1j C
(m−1)
j + 1
N∑
k=1
F
(1)
1k C
(m−1)
k

 (3.10)
As shown in (3.10), the rational expression of polynomials in terms of the ciphertext
consists of N2 unknown coefficients in the numerator and N unknowns in the denominator.
For each index of the plaintext, N2+N known ciphertexts are required to characterize the
unknown coefficients. Therefore, the total complexity of ciphertext decryption attack on one
round requires solving O(N(N2 +N)) = O(214.8) linear equations (Note: N = 2M = 30).
The complexity of the attack can be improved by employing a divide and conquer
strategy. Since each of the branches in in Figure 3.15 can be analyzed independently, the
attacker can choose the input to one of the branches to be zero thus allowing the coefficients
of the other branch to be identified separately from the other input. The divide and conquer
variation of the interpolation attack on one round uses chosen ciphertexts C(m) and C(m−1),
where each term has N unknowns. Each index of the plaintext can be solved with 2N chosen
ciphertexts. Therefore, the attack requires solving O(2N2) = O(210.8) linear equations. Note
that the complexity of this attack is 16 times faster than the initial interpolation attack,
which has a complexity of O(214.8). Nonetheless, both of these attacks are far below the
exhaustive key search complexity of O(2128). In this case, the attacker is able to gain the
ability of ciphertext decryption, but has not recovered information about the key.
3.4.3.2 Security of the two-round wavelet cryptosystem against the interpolation attack
In this section, we pursue the same interpolation attack for the two round wavelet encryp-
tion. Since the divide and conquer method aided in reducing the complexity of the one-round
attack, we will use this variety of the attack for the two-round case. The two-round wavelet
decryption is described by
P = F (1234)C(m) + F (34)
(
1
F (1)C(m−1)
)
+
1
F (123)C(m−1)
+
1
F (3)
(
1
F (1)C(m−2)
) (3.11)
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which is divided into three independent expressions in terms of the three ciphertexts, C(m),
C(m−1), C(m−2), on which the plaintext is dependent. This is illustrated in Figure 3.16. We
can separately consider the complexity of each polynomial now. For the first term,
[
Pm1
]
=
[
N∑
k=1
F
(1234)
1k C
(m)
k
]
(3.12)
the polynomial dependent on C(m) is simply F (1234). This polynomial has N unknowns (the
product of the four wavelet transformations). Therefore, it can be solved with N2 chosen
ciphertexts of C(m).
The second term of the expression for C(m−1) is described by
P = F (34)
(
1
F (1)C(m−1)
)
+
1
F (123)C(m−1)
(3.13)
We can write:
P1 =
N∑
k=1
F
(34)
1k


1
N∑
i=1
F
(1)
ki C
(m−1)
i

+


1
N∑
j=1
F
(123)
1j C
(m−1)
j

 (3.14)
Using Fact 1, the first term becomes
P1 =
N∑
k=1
F
(123)
1k C
(m−1)
k
N∑
h=1
F
(34)
1h
N∏
j=1,j 6=h
N∑
i=1
F
(1)
ji C
(m−1)
i +
N∑
h=1
F
(34)
1h
N∏
j=1,j 6=h
N∑
i=1
F
(1)
ji C
(m−1)
i
N∑
k=1
F
(123)
1k C
(m−1)
k
N∏
k=1
N∑
i=1
F
(1)
ji C
(m−1)
i
(3.15)
Equation (3.15) is used to determine the number of unknown coefficients of the polynomial
in C for one index of P . The denominator consists of NN+1 terms; these are all of the N+1
degree terms that are comprised of every combination of the indices of C, {C1, C2, . . . CN}.
Likewise, the numerator is comprised of all combinations of terms of degree N and all terms
of degree N+1. Therefore, the complexity of (3.13) is N(2NN+1 +NN )
The third term is the path that traverses across two Inv functions. The C(m−2) term is
described by
P1 =
1
F (3)( 1
F (1)C(m−2)
)
(3.16)
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Using Fact 1, the third term of the two-round interpolation attack is described by
P1 =
N∏
j=1
N∑
k=1
F
(1)
jk C
(m−2)
k
N∑
h=1
F
(3)
1h
N∏
i=1,i6=h
N∑
k=1
F
(1)
ik C
(m−2)
k
(3.17)
The third term will have N(2NN ) unknown coefficients for the entire plaintext. In total,
the two round divide-and-conquer variation of the interpolation attack has a complexity of
O(N(2NN +2NN+1+NN+1+N)) = O(2158) for N = 30. This is still of higher complexity
than the exhaustive key search for the wavelet cryptosystem, O(2128).
3.4.4 Analysis of the delta function attack
This section considers another approach, which is a chosen ciphertext attack where the
ciphertexts are delta functions. The motivation of this attack is that, with a minimal input
to the system, the polynomials involved in the interpolation attack would have a lower
complexity (i.e. less coefficients). According to Figure 3.16, an attack can consider one
index of the three possible ciphertext blocks, {C(m), C(m−1), C(m−2)}, to be a delta function
input. This method attempts to analyze a delta input to the structure. This approach is
similar to the divide and conquer variation of the interpolation attack; however, this method
will attempt to recover the key, thus resulting in a stronger attack.
The complexity of this attack is dependent on the ability to solve systems of nonlinear
equations. The extent of the analysis of this attack will be to provide an upper bound b
for the complexity of these attacks. The complexity will be determined through the bound
derived by Mo¨ller and Mora [34].
Fact 2. Let
r = the number of variables,
d = the maximum degree of the polynomials gi, the Grobner basis polynomials
and
s = the degree of the Hilbert polynomial (this is one less than the dimension; it
is between 0 and r − 1)
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The bound is
b = ((r + 1)(d+ 1) + 1)2
(s+1)(r+1)
To establish a lower bound on this sort of calculation, we will consider the case where
s = 0. From Figure 3.16, we consider the two ciphertext blocks, C(m) and C(m−2). The
C(m−2) contains key values from two wavelet transformations and the C(m) branch contains
no Inv functions. By placing the delta function in the ciphertext C(m) (without loss of
generality, the delta function in index 1, c1), the resulting recovered plaintext is expressed
by
Pi = C
(m−2)
1
N∑
h=1
N∑
j=1
N∑
l=1
F
(4)
ih F
(3)
hj F
(2)
jl F
(1)
l1 (3.18)
The delta function can also be placed in the ciphertext C(m−2); therefore, the recovered
plaintext is expressed by
Pi =

 N∑
j=1
F
(3)
ij
[
F
(1)
j1 C
(m−2)
1
]−1
−1
, (3.19)
which can also be represented by
Pi =
F
(1)
11 F
(1)
21 · · ·F (1)N1C(m−2)1
N∑
k=1
F
(3)
ik
N∏
j=1,j 6=k
F
(1)
j1
. (3.20)
Equation (3.20) shows that Pi is a function of all of the elements of the F
(1) and
F (3) matrices. However, the two-round wavelet cryptosystem is only dependent on 16 key
symbols. Therefore, Pi is a function of only 16 variables. Also, its maximum degree is N .
According to (3.18), the complexity to solve this nonlinear system of equations is O(2307).
The calculated upper bound suggests that this attack will not be feasible for the wavelet
cryptosystem. It is possible to reduce the complexity of the nonlinear systems of equations
by relinearization explained in [21, 55]. These methods have not proved to offer any threat
to the systems of equations generated with the wavelet encryption. Therefore, this offers
some validity to the calculated upper bound of the system in response to the delta function
attack.
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3.4.5 Security against an attack using the discrete Fourier transform
Another approach that an attacker may take is to consider an alternative but identical
representation of the wavelet cryptosystem. This section explores the potential for an attack
using the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) to generate an alternative representation, which
facilitates cryptanalysis of the wavelet algorithm.
3.4.5.1 Obtaining an alternate representation based on the DFT
For the wavelet algorithm, each functional block has a dual representation in the frequency
domain. The dual in the frequency domain of the e00 block is simply an index-by-index
multiplication of the DFT of the input block and the filter coefficients. Using properties
of the finite-field discrete Fourier transform [7], it is possible to represent the structure
containing the e00 block and the z
−M−1
2 cyclic shift from Figure 3.5 as shown in Figure
3.17. The vector x(i) = x
(i)
e |x(i)o is the input to the ith elementary decryption block (likewise
for the output vector y).
x
(i)
e
x
(i)
o
y
(i)
e
y
(i)
o
⋆ωℓ
⋆ωℓ
⋆E
(i)
00
IDFT
IDFT
DFT
DFT
Figure 3.17: DFT alternative representation of the elementary decryption block
Call the block in Figure 3.17 the DFT wavelet decryption block. In Figure 3.17, the DFT
and associated IDFT blocks represent the M-point discrete Fourier transform and its inverse,
respectively. The block labelled [⋆E
(i)
00 ] represents the element by element multiplication
with the DFT coefficients of the former e00 block. The block labelled [⋆ω
ℓ] is the dual of
the z−
M−1
2 cyclic shift operation, which is the element by element multiplication with ωℓ,
where ℓ = −M−12 . Define the vector ωk = [ ω0 ωk ω2k · · · ω(M−1)k ]. The parameter ω is
an element of order M in GF(256).
However, considering the upsampling and downsampling functions within the elemen-
tary decryption block, we represent two cascaded elementary decryption blocks with Figure
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3.18. The block labelled [⋆ω1] is the due to the upsampling, downsampling, and associ-
ated delays. It is possible to factor out the [⋆ω1] blocks so that the cascade of elementary
wavelet decryption blocks can be represented with the cascade of consecutive DFT decryp-
tion wavelet blocks and the appropriate number of multiples of the [⋆ω1] block, along with
the necessary DFT and IDFT blocks.
y
(i)
e
y
(i)
o
x
(j)
e
x
(j)
o
⋆ωℓ
⋆ωℓ⋆ωℓ
⋆ωℓ
⋆ω1
⋆ω1
⋆Ei00 ⋆E
j
00
IDFT
IDFT
DFT
DFT
Figure 3.18: Cascade of two elementary decryption blocks of the DFT alternative repre-
sentation.
This alternate representation changes the amount of diffusion that occurs between the
DFT and IDFT blocks. Each of the functions between the DFT and IDFT are index
by index operations, thus each symbol of y is only dependent upon the symbol of x of the
corresponding index. This pushes all of the diffusive dynamics of the block to the outermost
functions, DFT and IDFT. Since the DFT and IDFT cancel each other out in the cascade
of two consecutive DFT decryption wavelet blocks, no diffusion occurs from one block to
another. The next section describes the method to attack the wavelet system with this
alternative representation.
3.4.5.2 Analysis of the DFT-based Attack
It is possible to attack the two-round system with the DFT representation. By using the
branch originating from C(m) in Figure 3.16, we will try to recover the key. We consider the
alternative DFT representation of the C(m) expression (C =[C(m) 0 0]), which is 4 cascaded
DFT wavelet decryption blocks followed by 4 multiples of the ⋆ω1 function inside the DFT
and IDFT blocks. This attack recovers the individual key symbols by way of an exhaustive
search on one set of filter coefficients, e
(1)
00 and using a derived expression to obtain e
(2)
00 .
The chosen ciphertext C is [C(m) 0 0], where the odd and even indices of C(m) are such
that DFT (C) = Ce|Co. C(m−1) = 0 and C(m−2) = 0. With some manipulation we can
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show that the plaintext P = Pe|Po can be described by
Pe = IDFT (w
4ℓ+4 ⋆ Co + w
3ℓ+4 ⋆ (Co + Ce) ⋆ (E
(4)
00 + E
(3)
00 + E
(2)
00 + E
(1)
00 )) (3.21)
Po = IDFT (w
4ℓ+4 ⋆ Ce + w
3ℓ+4 ⋆ (Co + Ce) ⋆ (E
(4)
00 + E
(3)
00 + E
(2)
00 + E
(1)
00 )) (3.22)
Also note that the sum of the E
(i)
00 ’s can be written in terms of known values, defining this
expression, ΣE = [σE(0) · · · σE(M−1
2
)] to be
ΣE = E
(4)
00 + E
(3)
00 + E
(2)
00 + E
(1)
00 =
DFT (Pe)− w4ℓ+4 ⋆ Co
w3ℓ+4 ⋆ (Co + Ce)
(3.23)
Note that where E
(1)
00 and E
(2)
00 are the key dependent vectors that are chosen independently,
the vectors E
(3)
00 and E
(4)
00 are dependent upon E
(1)
00 and E
(2)
00 , respectively.
Each index of ΣE can be expressed by
σE(i) = E
(1)
00 (i) + E
(2)
00 (i) + E
(3)
00 (i) + E
(4)
00 (i) (3.24)
By observing (3.24), we can verify that, by a judicious choice of the permutation (that we
described in Section 3.3.2.3) the attacker cannot do better that an exhaustive search on all
of the key values. Hence, we conclude that the two-round wavelet cryptosystem is secure
against the DFT-based attack.
3.4.6 Summary of the attacks on WBC
Of the attacks on the wavelet algorithm presented thus far, Table 3.1 lists the computation
complexity required for the attacks. The attacks which use the method of solving nonlinear
systems of equations can be improved. These results show that the two-round wavelet
cryptosystem is secure against all of the proposed attacks.
Table 3.1: Computational complexity of cryptanalytic attacks on WBC
Attack Complexity
Exhaustive Key Search O(2128)
Divide And Conquer Interpolation O(2158)
Delta Function O(2307)
DFT-based O(2128)
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3.5 Computational complexity analysis of WBC
This section provides a comparison of the wavelet cryptosystem with two well known cryp-
tographic algorithms, DES and AES. The measures in Table 3.5 have been taken from the
NESSIE report [81] for DES and AES. We also include the results for the two-round wavelet
cryptosystem.
For our implementation, we have chosen to use the Montgomery arithmetic algorithms
[56] for the GF(256) multiplications and inverse operation required in the wavelet algorithm.
However, for our results in Table 3.5, we have provided a comparison of the algorithms where
the multiplication is considered to be a table look-up. In this way, all three algorithms con-
sist of table look-ups and logical operations. We claim that the operations required in each
algorithm give an indication of the potential speed in software and hardware. Obviously,
this metric is not the ultimate comparison as optimizations are made when implementing
each algorithm. However, WBC shows promise of being highly optimal in DPSs in that
there is a long history of implementing filter banks in DSPs, as mentioned previously. As
we expected, the complexity of the wavelet decryption is half that of the wavelet encryption.
The number of multiplications and logical operations for the wavelet algorithm as being su-
perior to those of DES and comparable to AES [81]. The last two rows show that WBC
possesses lower numbers of Table Lookups (‘TLUs per bit’) and comparable Logical Oper-
ations (‘Logical OPs per bit’) when normalized per bit in each algorithm. WBC does not
use complicated structures or operations. Hence, the system can be implemented by filters
(shift registers) and a simple inverse operation, which results in its efficient computational
complexity.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we provided an overview of the first application of finite-fields wavelets
to cryptography. A methodology, which we attribute to being work proposed by Fekri,
is presented that constructs cryptographic primitives by using nonlinear wavelets. One
interesting aspect of the proposed system is that it is easy to analyze. We studied both
the efficiency and security of the developed system. We show that the wavelet encryption
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Table 3.2: Complexity of operations for three block ciphers
Algorithm DES AES WBC Enc WBC Dec
Rounds 16 12 2 2
Block size (bits) 64 128 240 240
Word size (bits) 32 8 8 8
Key size (bits) 56 128 128 128
Table lookups/ Table size
(bits x bits)
123/8(6×4),
8/8(8×32),
64/11(8×48),
16/16(8×64),
0/8(8×56)
160(8×32) 184/(256×1) 122/(256×1)
Shifts/Rotations + multipli-
cations
0 30 124 124
XOR, ADD (bit size) 6 (32 bit) 64 (48
bit), 14 (64 bit)
11 (128 bit), 120
(32 bit)
1732 (8 bit) 926 (8 bit)
Total TLUs (8 bit) 216 160 60 60
Total logical OPs (8-bit) 520 656 1732 926
TLUs per bit 3.375 1.25 0.767 0.508
Logical OPs per bit 8.125 5.125 7.216 3.86
system with effective key size of 128 possesses computational complexity lower than DES
and comparable to AES with key sizes of 64 and 128, respectively. It is also imperative to
note that the wavelet decryption has almost half the complexity of the encryption. However,
the complexity of the decryption of DES is the same as the encryption and that of AES
is 30% slower than the encryption. Therefore, the complexity of the wavelet decryption is
lower than both DES and AES decryption. We investigated classical and new cryptanalytic
attacks against the wavelet cryptosystem. WBC does not possess strong linear or differential
characteristics. Furthermore, we developed variants of interpolation, delta function, and
discrete Fourier transform-based attacks, where we showed that these attacks cannot do
better than the exhaustive key search method. Wavelet-based cryptography presents a
new approach to cryptographic primitives that demonstrates promise for use in wireless
hand-held devices.
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PART II
Network Security
CHAPTER IV
SECURE CONNECTIVITY IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
4.1 Introduction
Secure communications and connectivity in wireless sensor networks are crucial require-
ments of network properties for many proposed applications of these networks [3]. The
requirements of networks are such that reliability and efficiency are of paramount impor-
tance. It is also necessary that the performance of these networks not sharply degrade as a
result of any security measures implemented in the network. Furthermore, it is worthwhile
to analyze the potential threat presented by an adversary to the network connectivity. It
is also important for the network to optimize the limited resources available in each of the
individual nodes, which also optimizes the global performance of the network. In this chap-
ter, we study the performance of networks with regard to global network connectivity and
secure communications.
We first look at the required communication range for nodes in a network to provide
connectivity. It is vital to provide each node a means to communicate with all nodes in the
network. While certain networking situations only require communication with the base
station, we envision a net-centric environment where the network may be highly dynamic
and reconfigurable to adjust to the flow of communications. The connectivity property is a
measurement of such an ability. We consider the connectivity of networks while employing
key management schemes that provide secure communications to the network. We also
observe increased demands on the resources of the nodes with the inclusion of security
measures to these networks. Here, we consider the key distribution scheme as the security
service. Additionally, we consider an adversarial presence in the network, and we examine
the effect that malicious attacks have on the network.
As the adversary gains control of nodes in the network, it is able to degrade connectivity
in the network by partitioning the network or isolating nodes as a result of capturing
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nodes. With the accumulation of key information, it may be possible for the adversary to
compromise links elsewhere in the network. This is a result of the necessity of the wireless
sensor network to employ a key predistribution scheme as opposed to the desired private
key infrastructure (PKI), which offers a greater measure of security [28, 85]. However, the
limitations of computational ability and direct communication with a trusted third party
render these PKI systems infeasible for wireless sensor networks. In PKI, each link created is
independent of other links in the network. In key predistribution schemes, there is an overlap
of key information among the established links. Thus, the adversary may compromise
a particular link without directly compromising either of the two nodes involved. The
adversary is able to eavesdrop and decrypt all transmissions for each compromised link. The
problem with the physical vulnerability of the sensor nodes is that the key information for
the key predistribution scheme is also vulnerable. In this work, we provide the first analysis
of global connectivity with respect to network parameters by considering key management
schemes and adversarial attacks. Current work focuses on studying connectivity with regard
to communication range and link-compromise in the context of key management schemes.
In this chapter, we study connectivity and the rate of link compromise by considering
these network properties while considering the global state of the network. We combine the
effects of communication range, key predistribution schemes and node-compromise attacks
into a single expression to evaluate connectivity in wireless sensor networks.
4.1.1 Network model
We employ the following notation throughout this chapter. We consider a network of n
nodes randomly distributed into a field of unit area. Each node has communication radius
r or r(n), where a uniform radius is assumed. For node-compromise attacks, we consider
either the number of compromised nodes, x, or the fraction of the network compromised, pc.
For the sake of analysis, we define the following probabilities in Table 4.1. When considering
pk, this is the probability of establishing a secure key based on the initial network parameters
upon deployment. The rate of link-compromise, pℓ, is a function of pc. In this work, we do
not consider node failures as a result of non-malicious actions. The purpose of studying psf
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Table 4.1: List of network probabilities to define wireless sensor network
pe Probability of establishing a link.
psf Probability that a sensor functions properly.
pk Probability two nodes can establish a secure link.
pc Fraction of the network compromised by the adversary.
pℓ Probability of link-compromise.
pconn Probability of network connectivity.
is in the context of adversarial attacks on the network; therefore in this work, psf = 1− pc.
We use random graphs and their properties to represent wireless sensor networks. A
graph is connected if there is a connected path of nodes and edges between any two nodes.
For clarity, we define several random graphs to represent wireless sensor networks in different
scenarios. First, we consider the simple geometric graph, G(n, r), which models a wireless
sensor network of n nodes with a link or edge between two nodes if the distance between
them is within communication range, r. For network schemes that employ a key distribution
scheme, we consider the secure link graph, G(n, r, pk). In this model, there is an edge
between two nodes that are within communication range, r, with probability pk, as defined
by the key predistribution scheme.
We also consider graphs representing networks that are deployed in adversarial environ-
ments, where an adversary is attacking the network by randomly capturing a fraction pc
of the nodes in the network. We define the compromised secure connectivity graph to be
G(n, r, pk, pc). The case where the compromise of nodes is not random is not considered in
this chapter.
We note some relationships between these defined network models. There are differences
between the connectivity and the secure link graph when nodes begin to become compro-
mised. In the geometric graph G(n, r), any node that is removed from the network affects
only links that are incident with the compromised node. However, for the compromised
secure link graph G(n, r, pk, pc), the removal of the fraction pc of the nodes in the network
additionally removes pℓ edges from the network. These links are indirectly compromised
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as defined by the security model that we employ. The security model we follow is that
each node possesses a finite number of cryptographic keys that are used to create secure
links between nodes. The capture of a node results in the compromise of all of the key
information in the captured node. Accumulation of compromised nodes and their associ-
ated key information results in the compromise of links elsewhere in the network, where
the key information used to establish a particular link has been acquired by the adversary.
Therefore, in G(n, r, pk, pc), the rate of link-compromise pℓ is a function of the fraction of
nodes compromised. Determining this relationship with regard to connectivity is one of the
contributions in this chapter.
4.1.2 Overview of contribution
We explore the relationship between network properties with respect to the resources ex-
pended by the individual nodes and the effect of malicious attacks on the network. The
contribution of this work is a metric that enables a fair comparison of particular instances of
wireless networks employing key management schemes where there is an adversary present
in the network. The metric compares the relative resource usage of each node required to
maintain a certain network property. In this work, we consider global connectivity and
consider the measure of required communication radius to compare various instances of
wireless sensor networks. While sensor nodes do not necessarily support dynamic transmis-
sion power, we use this as a measure of the resource usage of the network to compare with
other instances or conditions of the network. While this chapter does not propose a new key
predistribution scheme, this work proposes a metric that is used to compare the resilience
of network resources employing different key predistribution schemes and to examine how
they react in the presence of adversarial attacks.
Section 4.2 establishes a baseline approach to consider the simple case of global net-
work connectivity and identify its relationship to communication range. We also consider
both simple connectivity graphs G(n, r) and secure connectivity networks G(n, r, pk). This
establishes a practical network scenario in terms of the resource usage required to imple-
ment key predistribution schemes on a wireless network. These expressions can be used
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to compare the resource cost of G(n, r, pk) with G(n, r) or the difference in resource cost
between various instances of key predistribution schemes. Additionally, we consider the
same problem in response to an adversarial node compromise attack. In Section 4.3, we
study the relationship between pc and ps, pe on the G(n, r, pk, pc). We derive an expres-
sion that considers key distribution schemes and node-compromise attacks, which is used
to determine the communication range required for network connectivity. Last, Section 4.4
introduces the resiliency-connectivity (rc) metric, a metric that measures the resilience of
wireless networks employing key management schemes in the presence of adversarial attacks
by observing the communication range required for global connectivity. The resilience of
the required communication radius reflects the overall resources consumed by the network
in these particular scenarios to maintain the global property of connectivity. The notable
contribution of this work is the establishment of the important relationship between con-
nectivity and security in wireless sensor networks. One aspect of this topic that we do
not consider is the problem of adversarial node detection and revocation. This is a diffi-
cult problem, but we consider this to be a separate problem of study. We allow ourselves
to assume that the network can determine which nodes have been compromised from the
network. Additionally, compromised nodes cannot masquerade as legitimate nodes in the
network.
4.1.3 Related work
We review several previous results in areas related to the connectivity property in wireless
networks. This chapter involves the study of networking properties including connectiv-
ity, key management schemes, and adversarial models in sensor networks. The composite
relationship between these networking properties is explored in this chapter. We consider
different key predistribution schemes and extend recent developments regarding the con-
nectivity property for wireless sensor networks.
In terms of connectivity, Gupta and Kumar [43, 44, 99] present the classical work on
wireless networks. This work generates results for connectivity on the graphG(n, p). Pishro-
nik [79] derives expressions for connectivity in large-scale sensor networks. Rather than
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using G(n, p), this work considers G(n, r, pe, ps), since the G(n, r, pe, ps) graph is argued
to be a more appropriate representation of wireless sensor networks and their associated
limitations. An expression is derived to specify the minimum communication radius in order
for the network to be connected by
r(n) ≥
√
lnn
npsfpeπfmin
as n→∞. (4.1)
The expression includes the minimum node density of the distribution of the nodes in the
network fmin. We consider nodes in a network that are distributed into a field in a uniformly
random deployment; therefore, fmin = 1 in this work. A network of these parameters will
be connected with high probability if the communication radius is greater than r(n) as
defined by (4.1). This work also states that connectivity not only occurs at this value of
r(n), but also exhibits a sharp threshold effect.
There are several proposed methods for key management schemes for wireless sensor
networks. Because of their large-scale deployments, a promising approach for establishing
secure links within networks in a randomly deployed network is the idea of key predistri-
bution. Details of these works are described in Section 2.3.3. Eschenauer and Gligor [35]
provide one of the original works on key predistribution schemes for sensor networks. Chan
[13] follows up on this scheme by proposing a q-composite scheme where q common keys are
required to establish a secure link. We note that the Eschenauer scheme is equivalent to the
q-composite scheme when q = 1. Du et al. [32] proposed a scheme that combines the ran-
dom key predistribution approach with the classical method of Blom’s key predistribution
[8]. The goal of this approach is to increase the resilience of the network to node-compromise
attacks without increasing memory usage. Also, Liu and Ning [60] develop a pairwise key
establishment scheme using a polynomial-based key predistribution protocol and proba-
bilistic key distribution methods. This scheme suggests advantages over other schemes by
having keys with a threshold property. Additionally, the rate of compromised links as a
result of node compromises in the network also behaves with this threshold effect. Delgosha
[26] proposes a key predistribution scheme based on multivariate symmetric polynomials.
Also, there are key predistribution methods that take advantage of deployment knowledge.
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Du et al. [33] and Liu and Ning [60, 61] propose schemes that exploit deployment knowledge
to increase network performance in terms of connectivity and memory usage.
We consider the two schemes of multivariate symmetric polynomial key predistribution
[26] and random key predistribution [35] in our work to investigate the resilience of networks
to node-compromise attacks. Additionally, we demonstrate the relevance of this work for
networks of varying size, so we consider large- and small-scale networks. For the q-composite
scheme, a networking instance is defined by the value of q, the size of the key ring, and the
size of the key pool. We denote this scheme by qcomp(n, q,m, P ). For the multivariate
polynomial scheme, one instance of this scheme is defined by the dimension of the key space
b and the degree of the polynomials used, t, so we have mkps(n, b, t). In the interest of
space and clarity, this work consists of simulation and analytical results pertaining to only
the q-composite and multivariate symmetric polynomial key predistribution schemes.
4.2 Communications range and connectivity
We first consider G(n, r) and determine the communication range that every node needs to
transmit in order to have global network connectivity. As stated earlier, this establishes the
baseline networking case. According to (4.1), the r(n) required for connectivity in G(n, r)
is
r(n) ≥
√
lnn
nπ
. (4.2)
This is shown in Figure 4.1, where the probability of connectivity is plotted versus the
communication range r(n) of the nodes in the network. The plot for G(n, r) for n = 5000
is the solid line plot.
We also consider the networks employing key predistribution schemes as modelled by the
secure connectivity graph, G(n, r, pk). The parameters for each key predistribution scheme
determine pk. The term pk in (4.3) is the pe in (4.1) since the probability of establishing a
link is only dependent on the key predistribution scheme in this networking situation. We
will see later that pe also considers the fraction of compromised links, pℓ. Therefore, we can
represent the required communication range for this network model, given n and pk, by
r(n) ≥
√
lnn
npkπ
. (4.3)
65
Parameters between the two key predistribution schemes were chosen such that the
memory usage in each individual sensor node is identical. We define one key in the qcomp
to be equivalent in memory size to one polynomial coefficient in the mkps. In [26], it states
that the memory usage is b(t+ 1)F, where F is the size of the field being used. Therefore,
by assuming each key in the key ring for the q-composite scheme key ring is from the field
F, we set m = b(t+ 1).
The required communication range for connectivity plots for the geometric graph and
secure connectivity networks are shown in Figure 4.1. The probability of connectivity of the
network versus the required communication radius is plotted for qcomp(5000, 1, 20, 1000)
and mkps(5000, 2, 9). Based on the parameters of each key distribution scheme, pk(mkps) =
0.0278 and pk(qcomp) = 0.3350. According to (4.3), the threshold value r(n) for the q-
composite scheme is r(n) = 0.0402 and for the multivariate scheme is r(n) = 0.1397.
Figure 4.1 shows the results of pconn versus r(n) for G(n, r), qcomp(5000, 1, 20, 1000), and
mkps(5000, 2, 9) determined by simulation. It seems that the qcomp network appears to be
more resource efficient than the network, as the required communication radius for qcomp
is almost one-third of the mkps communication radius. However, we see that this is not
necessarily the case, as is investigated in the following sections.
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Figure 4.1: pconn vs. r(n) for G(n, r), qcomp(5000, 1, 20, 1000) and mkps(5000, 2, 9).
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4.3 Connectivity with node-compromise
After establishing the baseline connectivity requirements in networks employing key predis-
tribution schemes, we now consider the presence of an adversary in the network. A fraction
pc of the nodes in the network is compromised by the adversary. This section examines the
effect of the node-compromise attack and its influence on connectivity among other network
properties. We identify which key predistribution schemes provide greater resilience to node
compromise attacks.
For networks employing key management schemes, we consider the network model
G(n, r, pk, pc). In this model, for each compromised node, its key information is also com-
promised. The adversary can use its set of compromised keys to compromise links elsewhere
in the network. A link in the network is compromised if the adversary has obtained all the
keys used to create the secure link. It is necessary to investigate the relationship between pc
and the probability of link-compromise, pℓ. Where pℓ is a function of pc, it is also dependent
on the key predistribution scheme.
To adapt (4.3) to this networking situation involving key predistribution schemes and
node-compromise attacks, we include pc and pℓ in our analysis to define the expression
r(n) ≥
√
lnn
n(1− pc)pk(1− pℓ)π . (4.4)
This section describes how each of these parameters affects the network. We study the
communication range requirements to provide connectivity to a network as a function of
the fraction of compromised nodes pc. It is possible to provide analysis with (4.4). In this
section, we analyze the relationships between the fraction pc of the network compromised
and both pℓ and psf . As stated previously, the probability of a sensor properly functioning
is defined by psf = (1−pc). Additionally, we represent pe with both pℓ and pk, as these two
network parameters affect the probability that a link is formed. At the same time, pℓ and
pk are independent of each other, so they can be represented as the product pe = (1−pℓ)pk.
While we can determine pk from the initial network parameters, the relationship between
pc and pℓ with regard to G(n, r, pk, pc) depends on the key predistribution scheme.
We now describe the relationship of pc to pℓ by the choice of the key predistribution
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scheme. We need to analyze key predistribution schemes and determine the rate at which
links are compromised in the network. First, this involves detailing the rate at which
key information is compromised as a function of the number of nodes compromised in
the network. Then, the rate of link compromise can be determined by the rate at which
key information is obtained by the adversary. These expressions can be inserted into (4.4).
After these rates are identified, it is possible to create the analysis between node-compromise
attacks and the rate of link-compromise to network connectivity in Section 4.4.
4.3.1 Rate of link-compromise for MKPS
For mkps, each node possesses b key shares for each dimension of the key space. Since
the identities of two nodes that have established a secure link differ in one index, the link
between the two nodes can be compromised if the b− 1 common polynomials are recovered
by the adversary.
We note that the order t of the polynomials used in the network determines the ability of
the adversary to compromise a polynomial in this scheme. In order to recover the coefficients
of the polynomial, the adversary needs
(
t+b−1
b−1
)
key shares of a polynomial to have enough
information. Therefore, increasing t simply increases the resilience of this scheme against
adversarial attacks while only increasing the memory usage for each node. However, one
can see that varying t does not affect pk. As stated in Section 6.2.1, the authors determine
the probability of link-compromise in pℓ(mkps) in (2.11), which is the compromise of b − 1
polynomials for a specific link.
4.3.2 Rate of link-compromise for QCOMP
In the case of the q-composite key predistribution scheme, the rate of link-compromise
is a function of the fraction of the key pool that is compromised. It can be shown that
the number of keys compromised from the network P ′ is a function of the fraction pc of
compromised nodes and network parameters m,P by the expression
P ′ = P
(
1−
(
1− m
P
)pcn)
. (4.5)
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After determining the number of compromised keys as a function of the number of
compromised nodes, we determine the rate of compromised links as a function of the number
of compromised nodes. In this scheme, the adversary is able to compromise a secure link if
all the q keys in the secure link have been obtained. The expected number of compromised
links is a function of the number of compromised keys. The rate of link-compromise is
determined by the network parameters q, P, P ′ in the expression
pℓ(qcomp) =
(
P ′
q
)
(
P
q
) . (4.6)
We note that the total number of secure links present in the network is ⌈n(πr2n)pk⌉,
where ⌈πr2n⌉ is the average degree of a node in the network. With respect to security,
it is desirable for pℓ to increase as slowly as possible. Along with pc, these are the two
adversarial parameters that have a direct influence on overall network connectivity.
Additionally, we note one caveat is that this study allows for the q-composite key pre-
distribution scheme. In this key predistribution scheme, two nodes may share more than q
keys. The original q-composite scheme creates a session key based on q of the set of shared
keys. Compromise of the q keys used to create that particular secure link results in the
compromise of the link. This study allows for nodes to recognize which nodes and subse-
quently which keys to remove from their own key ring. Two nodes can establish a new link
with the remaining shared keys. For example, two nodes in a q-composite network (with
q = 2) share four keys {k1, k2, k3, k4}. If the initial session key is k = f(k1, k2), and if k1 and
k2 are compromised, then the link is compromised according to the original q-composite
scheme. For this work, we allow a new key k′ to be established as a new session key, where
k′ = f(k3, k4).
4.4 Resiliency-Connectivity metric analysis
While the probability of link-compromise directly determines the increased adversarial con-
trol of the network, this also affects the connectivity properties of the remaining legitimate
nodes. Obviously, one strategy in the securing of these networks is to exclusively concentrate
on a network that minimizes the probability of link failure resulting from the compromise
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of key information elsewhere in the network.
One extreme approach is to have each node carry a unique key for every other node
in the network. The compromise of any number of nodes does not reveal any information
about any other links in the network. However, prohibitive amounts of memory usage in
each node make this scheme impractical, as each node in the network must carry n − 1
keys. On the other extreme, a network could implement a key management scheme using a
global key to minimize storage requirements for each node, where the same key is used in
every link in the network. However, any node compromise results in the compromise of all
key information in the network, which is not desirable.
Therefore, when considering resource-constrained devices, there is a compromise be-
tween employing key predistribution schemes, which result in a high probability of secure
link establishment, and those that establish resilient links in the face of node compromise
attacks. Existing work contains comparisons between other key predistribution schemes to
attempt to justify improvements on previous schemes by separately considering the rates of
link-compromise and secure link establishment. We provide a composite analysis of these
two vital network parameters that have thus far been analyzed separately.
The relationships that have been previously analyzed are the fraction of the network
compromised and the probability of link compromise (pc vs. pℓ) and the relationship of
the probability of secure link establishment and overall network connectivity (pk vs. pconn).
Here, we want to combine these two relationships to ultimately find the relationship between
node compromises and overall network connectivity (pc vs. pconn). We call the result of
this analysis the resiliency-connectivity (rc) metric, which is illustrated in Figure 4.2. The
rc metric analysis determines the resilience of a network in terms of connectivity with an
adversarial presence as a function of required communication radius r(n). This resilience is
a representation of the relative amount of resources required by the nodes in the network
in order to maintain global connectivity.
With our analysis of G(n, r, pk, pc), it is possible to examine network connectivity as a
function of the fraction of compromised nodes in the network. With regard to connectivity,
we consider the global connectivity within a deployment of a sensor network. This is the
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of the resiliency-connectivity (rc) metric.
first study that considers node compromises in wireless sensor networks and the influence
on global secure network connectivity. We establish the rc metric to compare various
instances of wireless sensor networks using key predistribution schemes. This is a measure
of the ability of the network to maintain an adequate number of secure links to have global
secure connectivity given an increasing pc. From a first look of the rc metric, one could
simply look at the connectivity property of the network as a function of the fraction of the
network that is compromised. However, we choose to consider the required communication
radius for our analysis, as noted in Figure 4.2.
With the assumption that sensor nodes can dynamically adjust their transmission range,
the rate at which nodes within a network have to expend additional resources to maintain
connectivity can determine an ordering between networks in terms of their resilience to
node-compromise attacks. For example, the two baseline key management schemes (global
key and pairwise keys) have the two extreme resilience performance metrics. For a network
using a global key, pℓ = 1 for any value of pc > 0. Therefore, the communication range
required for connectivity is infinite once a single node is compromised. This follows from the
idea that all links are compromised with the compromise of one, since any node holds the key
information for the entire network. On the other hand, a network employing the pairwise
key scheme is optimally resilient in that for each node that is compromised, the adversary
gains no additional information about links elsewhere in the network. Thus, for the pairwise
scheme, pℓ = 0. However, for other key predistribution schemes, we can analyze the the rc
metric by using our analysis of secure connectivity with node-compromise attacks. From
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(4.1) we derive (4.4) to examine the rc properties of the secure connectivity graph by
r(n) ≥
√
lnn
π(1− pℓ)(1− pc)npk . (4.7)
It is noted that n and pk are network design parameters that are independent of pc, while
pℓ is a function of pc. So, it is possible to characterize the required communication radius
r(n) with (4.7) as a function of the network design parameters and pc.
We can investigate the increasing required communication radius as the number of
compromised nodes increases. A desirable networking scenario is such that r(n) increases
minimally as pc increases. An increasing r(n) can be interpreted by the idea that as the
network is losing nodes and links, each node is forced to attempt to communicate with more
nodes in order to establish global connectivity. The pℓ of a networking scheme more resilient
to node-compromise attacks increases at a slower rate than others, which results in r(n)
increasing at a slower rate. We also note that there are instances where the network will
never be connected regardless of what range the nodes can transmit (resulting in r(n)→∞).
In the compromised secure connectivity graph G(n, r, pk, pc), the new communication range
value r′(n) from (4.4) can be written in terms of the initial r(n) specified from GS(n, r, pk)
and (4.3). With high probability, the compromised secure connectivity graph G(n, r, pk, pc)
is connected again with communication radius r′(n) specified by
r′(n)
r(n)
≥
√
lnn
npk(1−pc)(1−pℓ)π√
lnn
npkπ
=
√
1
(1− pc)(1− pℓ) . (4.8)
We note that the ratio of the increased communication range in the networks with
node compromises is illustrated in the following two sections, 4.4.1-2. The rc metric is
represented by showing the relationship between r(n) and pc. Section 4.4.1 contains Figures
4.4, 4.5, and 4.6, which are the rc metric results for large-scale networks. Section 4.4.2
has Figures 4.10 and 4.11 to show the simulation results for the rc metric for small-scale
networks. For small-scale networks, we show that the asymptotic analysis described by (4.4)
fails to accurately determine the required communication range for small-scale networks.
Despite the inaccuracies of the asymptotic model for connectivity of small-scale networks, we
observe that the comparison of the two key predistribution schemes demonstrates behavior
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similar to the large-scale networks.
It is worth mentioning that this approach may not be efficient or optimal in certain situ-
ations or applications. There are instances where every node may not need to communicate
with the transmission power as stipulated by (4.4) and still have a global connectivity.
Equivalently, there may be cases where, if a small subset of nodes increases its communica-
tion range by some value, connectivity is reestablished. Furthermore, dynamically adjusting
the communication range may not be possible for nodes in certain networks, or the adjust-
ment may be too costly in terms of energy usage.
4.4.1 RC metric for large-scale networks
This section considers the rc metric with regard to large-scale wireless networks using
analytical expressions derived thus far. Using (4.7), we have found the required commu-
nication radius as a function of the number of compromised nodes for networks of 5000
nodes. In these cases, each network has been created using one of the two key predis-
tribution schemes. For example, the rc metric concept is illustrated in Figure 4.3 where
r(n) versus pc is plotted for a large-scale network simulated with the q-composite predis-
tribution scheme, qcomp(5000, 1, 30, 5000). The increase of r(n) is shown as a function of
an increasing fraction of the network becoming compromised, pc. With this analysis, it is
possible to compare instances of secure networks and determine the relative resilience of
the networks to node-compromise attacks. In the case of the rc metric, the more resilient
network with respect to connectivity is the one that requires less transmission radius over
values of pc. The interpretation of the rc metric is that the required communication range
is a measure of the resources required to maintain global connectivity in the network. The
rc metric addresses the expected increase in resources required to maintain connectivity in
the presence of node compromise attacks. This section illustrates the use of the metric by
comparing the resilience of qcomp and mkps with various comparable parameters.
For consistent and proper comparison between networks, we consider wireless networks
of sensor nodes where each node stores the same amount of key information in memory. Ad-
ditionally, we consider the case where the initial probability of secure link establishment, pk
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Figure 4.3: r(n) required for connectivity vs. pc for qcomp(5000, 1, 30, 5000).
for each network is the same. Furthermore, this results in an initial required communication
range r(n) being the same for each key predistribution scheme. The parameters for the key
predistribution schemes are chosen accordingly. For example, we consider three networks
in mkps(5000, 2, 9), qcomp(5000, 1, 20, 14200), and qcomp(5000, 2, 20, 1500). Based on the
derivations of pk(qcomp) and pk(mkps) and the parameters of each network, pk = 0.0278 for
each of the networks. Additionally, each of the nodes in these networking instances is set
to m = b(t + 1) = 20. Figure 4.4 is a plot comparing the rc metric of three network in-
stances in mkps(5000, 2, 9), qcomp(5000, 1, 20, 14200), and qcomp(5000, 2, 20, 1500). First,
the qcomp network where q = 2 possesses an inferior rc metric compared to the other two
networks. From the plot, the mkps network performs better with regard to the rc metric
for values of approximately pc < 0.15. However, the qcomp network where q = 1 is more
resilient for pc > 0.15. Between qcomp networks of {q = 1} and {q = 2}, the {q = 2}
network has a key pool that is considerably smaller than the key pool for the {q = 1} net-
work. With the same memory, the link-compromise rate occurs at a much faster rate since a
greater fraction of the key pool is compromised with each increase in pc. With regard to the
mkps network, its behavior in demonstrating greater resilience than the qcomp network
for low values of pc can be attributed to the threshold property in its link security.
We also show a comparison of the rc metric for instances of large-scale networks for
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Figure 4.4: r(n) required for connectivity vs. pc for qcomp(5000, 1, 20, 14200) and
qcomp(5000, 2, 20, 1500) and mkps(5000, 2, 9).
both the mkps and qcomp schemes, mkps(5000, 3, 9), qcomp(5000, 1, 30, 103000), and
qcomp(5000, 2, 30, 6325). Figure 4.5 shows three networks that possess equal initial values
of pk and require the same amount of memory in each node. This illustration demonstrates
the effect on the rc metric by modifying parameters of the respective key predistribu-
tion schemes. As compared to Figure 4.4, the rc metric for mkps(5000, 3, 9) compared to
mkps(5000, 2, 9) shows significant improvement of the rc metric as a function of pc com-
pared to its qcomp network counterpart. The rc metric of the mkps network performs
better than that of the qcomp network for values of pc < 0.5. The increase in the dimen-
sion of the key space for the mkps network provides an increase in link security of the key
predistribution scheme. Increasing the b parameter pushes the threshold of pℓ(mkps), where
links become compromised at higher values of pc. Furthermore, we show the rc metric
for mkps with b = 4 and its corresponding qcomp network in Figure 4.6. This network
instance takes advantage of the t-secure property, as described in [26]. Regardless of the
magnitude of pc, pℓ(mkps) = 0 since there is not a sufficient number of key shares in the
network to recover the polynomial coefficients. The mkps(5000, 4, 9) network outperforms
the qcomp(5000, 1, 4, 330000) network with regard to the rc metric.
These examples demonstrate the utility of the rc metric. It is possible to use the rc
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metric to compare the performance of any key predistribution schemes in terms of node-
compromise attacks.
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Figure 4.5: rc metric results for mkps(5000, 3, 9), qcomp(5000, 1, 30, 103000),
qcomp(5000, 2, 30, 6325).
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Figure 4.6: rc metric results for mkps(5000, 4, 9), qcomp(5000, 1, 40, 330000).
4.4.2 RC metric for small-scale networks
This section investigates the viability of the rc metric for small-scale networks. The an-
alytical results that we have shown with respect to the rc metric are valid for large-scale
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sensor networks, as these are asymptotic results (for n → ∞). However, for small n, the
analytical results in [79] are not valid. Figure 4.7 shows the plot of the probability of con-
nectivity versus communication radius r(n). The two small-scale networks that are plotted
are mkps(500, 2, 9) and qcomp(500, 1, 20, 4620). Note that the value of pk and memory
usage are equivalent for both networks. Although the network begins to become connected
with non-zero probability at the asymptotic threshold for connectivity, it is evident that for
small-scale networks, the threshold effect is not present or an accurate measure of connec-
tivity. This behavior that makes the asymptotic results invalid for small scale networks can
be attributed to boundary effects and a sparse network deployment. Therefore, we cannot
depend on these results to provide accurate estimates of the connectivity property for these
networks. In this section, we aim to perform security and connectivity analysis similar to
the large-scale networks and show their relevance to small-scale networks. Our justification
for the connectivity behavior will be in the form of simulations.
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Figure 4.7: pconn vs. r(n) for mkps(500, 2, 9) and qcomp(500, 1, 20, 4620) and the theo-
retical asymptotic connectivity threshold.
For small-scale networks, we have implemented actual instances of the key predistri-
bution schemes in simulation. In analyzing the rc metric for small-scale networks, we
determine the communication radius r(n) that is required to establish connectivity among
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the remaining legitimate nodes in the network. The simulations were performed by remov-
ing pc of the nodes as well as their associated compromised links. Then, the communication
radius was increased incrementally until global connectivity was established in the net-
work. We show the probability of connectivity versus pc for qcomp(500, 1, 20, 4620) and
mkps(500, 2, 9) in Figure 4.8. This analysis was was performed along with the simulations
to determine the required communication radius in compromised secure networks.
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Figure 4.8: pconn vs. pc for qcomp(500, 1, 20, 4620) and mkps(500, 2, 9).
Furthermore, we look at the rc metric simulation results for small-scale networks. First,
Figure 4.9 illustrates the disparity of the actual rc metric performance of a network defined
by qcomp(500, 1, 20, 4620) versus the theoretical result. It is evident that the large-scale
analysis does not accurately portray the actual behavior of the rc metric for small-scale
networks.
We show the justification of the viability of the rc metric for small-scale networks
through the simulation of two instances of qcomp and mkps networks. Figure 4.10 shows
the comparison of networks of 500 nodes and the plots of r(n) as a function of pc for two
instances of compromised secure connectivity networks. The solid line with x’s is the plot for
mkps(500, 2, 9) and the dashed line with circles represents the plot for qcomp(500, 1, 20, 4620).
We also note that there is a dashed-dotted line extrapolating the mkps network simulation.
As with the large-scale networks, the memory usage and initial pk values in each node for
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Figure 4.9: Comparison of actual rc metric performance and theoretical asymptotic result
for qcomp(500, 1, 20, 4620).
the key predistribution schemes have been set to be the same. In this case, m = 20 and
the initial value of pk = 0.0832. We can observe that the mkps network is more resilient
than the qcomp network for node-compromise values up to pc = 0.25, where the network
is not connected with high probability. This comparative resilience between the two key
predistribution schemes is similar to that of the large-scale model results. The mkps scheme
demonstrates a more desirable performance of the rc for low values of pc, but soon gives
way to the qcomp scheme for pc ≈ 0.25.
The second instance of the rc metric for small-scale networks is in Figure 4.11, which
shows the rcmetric for two networks inmkps(500, 3, 9) and qcomp(500, 1, 30, 21550), where
pk = 0.04 and m = 30. The behavior of the two key predistribution schemes for small-scale
networks matches the relative performance of the rc metric for large-scale networks. When
increasing the dimension of the key space (the parameter b) in the mkps network, this
yields a considerable increase in the rc metric. The rc metric result of mkps for b = 3
demonstrates a greater resiliency and rc metric performance than for the associated qcomp
network. We note that the sacrifice of the networks in Figure 4.10 and those in Figure 4.11
is the initial required communication radius r(n).
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Figure 4.10: r(n) required for connectivity vs. pc for mkps(500, 2, 9) with extrapolation
and qcomp(500, 1, 20, 4620).
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Figure 4.11: r(n) required for connectivity vs. pc for qcomp(500, 1, 30, 21550) and
mkps(500, 3, 9).
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4.5 Summary
This work has analyzed the effect of node-compromise attacks on sensor networks and its
interaction with key predistribution schemes and secure network connectivity. Investigat-
ing the communication range required for connectivity is the approach we used to compare
the resilience of networks to node-compromise attacks. We have established a relation-
ship between the communication range and key predistribution parameters for large-scale
networks through analysis and simulation. Then, we established the relationship between
node-compromise attacks and the communication range required for connectivity in large-
scale networks. With these relationships, we introduced the resiliency-connectivity (rc)
metric, which is a measure that determines the resilience of the connectivity for a network
in the presence of an adversarial entity. Additionally, we have extended these results to
small-scale networks through simulations. The resilience of the network measures the abil-
ity of a particular network instance to maximize properties relating to connectivity while
minimizing the usage of limited resources throughout the network.
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CHAPTER V
RELATING NETWORK LATENCY AND THE RESILIENCE OF KEY
PREDISTRIBUTION TO NODE-COMPROMISE ATTACKS
5.1 Introduction
We analyzed the resilience of the global connectivity of wireless sensor networks using key
predistribution in the presence of an adversary in the previous chapter. In this chapter, we
consider network properties involving the transmission of information amongst the nodes.
The analysis of these network properties includes the temporal aspect of networking sce-
narios, whereas our analysis of network connectivity only considered the resilience of static
network properties. The temporal aspect of the network scenario allows for the analysis of
packets being transmitted throughout the network. This results in a dynamic situation as
the set of nodes that are actively transmitting changes with time. In order to consider the
dynamic nature of the network, it is necessary to incorporate network services to deal with
the flow of packets. For this work, we define a medium access control (MAC) protocol, a
routing protocol, and a traffic model. As in Chapter 4, where we considered the effect of
node compromise attacks on secure network connectivity, we consider the effect that key
predistribution and adversarial attacks have on the ability of the nodes in the network to de-
liver packets to a specific destination (a sink node). We analyze the average packet latency
for various networking parameters and also establish a measure of achievable throughput for
these networks. The goal of this work is to consider packet latency and network throughput
in wireless sensor networks employing key predistribution schemes. Further, we study these
issues when the network is under adversarial node-compromise attack.
We expect that the behavior of the delivery of packets to the sink to perform similarly
to the results for connectivity in Chapter 4. In the previous chapter, we determined the
communication radius of the nodes required for the network to be connected. As derived in
Section 4.2 with (4.3), networks with equivalent n, r and pk, have the same requirement for
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communication range to provide connectivity. In the same way, we expect that networks
with similar parameters to provide similar networking performance in terms of average
packet latency and achievable throughput. For example, if we consider the networking
scenario where events occur in one location of the network and need to be sent to another
area of the network, the packets containing this information will be transmitted in a multi-
hop fashion through the network until it reaches its destination. Depending on several
parameters which include routing and channel access protocols, the information will arrive
at its destination after some delay in time, or latency. Given networks with equivalent n,
r, and pk, these networks will, on average, have a comparable number of links to transmit
information through the network. Thus, we expect networks with the same pk to perform
similarly in terms of the average time it takes to transmit packets through the network. We
explore this property of packet latency and achievable throughput with respect to different
key predistribution schemes for wireless sensor networks.
Furthermore, we consider latency and throughput in networks that are being attacked
by an adversary. As shown in Chapter 4, the node compromise attacks not only remove
nodes from the network, but links are also compromised as the adversary accumulates
key information from the compromised nodes. As the links and nodes in the network
are compromised, it is expected that the average packet latency increases and the packet
reliability degrades. We examine this behavior on wireless sensor networks that are using
key predistribution schemes.
Existing work with regard to packet latencies in wireless sensor networks has considered
the idea of energy efficiency via sleep scheduling [69, 31, 101]. The lifetime of the network
is increased by having each node periodically enter a sleep state, which reduces the energy
consumption from processing and transmitting across the network. There are strategies to
optimize the transitions between the sleep and active states. In the same way, we consider
latency given a fraction of the network compromised by an adversary. For a network in
an adversarial environment, one can consider some fraction of the nodes and links to be
removed from the network. Instead of nodes being unavailable while being in the sleep
state, nodes and links are unavailable as a result of being compromised.
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We compare the resilience of the maximum achievable throughput or average packet
latency as a function of the magnitude of the adversarial attack for different key predis-
tribution schemes. The resilience of wireless sensor networks and their key predistribution
schemes to node compromise attacks can be measured by the increase in packet latency or
the decrease in maximum achievable throughput. We present results by providing simu-
lations for networks comparing the qcomp and mkps key predistribution schemes. First,
we examine the average packet latency and packet reliability as a function of adversarial
influence in the network. Second, we determine the maximum achievable throughput of the
networks with respect to adversarial attacks. Last, we examine average packet latency as
a function of the distance from the sink node. Considering packet latency at different dis-
tances from the sink illustrates the resilience of the network, given the key predistribution
scheme, from another perspective. We also consider packet latency in network instances
of mkps and the variation of the dimension parameter, d. We determine that the mkps
key predistribution provides a more resilient network against the node-compromise attack
compared to networks using qcomp.
5.2 Network model
We consider a network of n nodes uniformly randomly deployed into a field of unit area.
Each node has communication radius r and establishes a secure link with a neighbor with
probability pk, as defined by the key predistribution scheme used. We consider and compare
the behavior of qcomp and mkps. In this networking situation, there is a sink node placed
in the center (0.5, 0.5) of the unit area. We investigate the network while it is operating in a
data-gathering scenario. The nodes in the network detect events and generate corresponding
packets to be sent to the sink node in a multi-hop fashion.
In terms of network performance, the latency of a packet is the time between the time
that the packet is generated to the time that it reaches its destination. Also, packet relia-
bility is the probability that a packet being sent will actually reach its final destination. We
define average packet latency, t to be the average packet latency of all packets generated
from all nodes of the network. Likewise, average packet reliability, designated as ρ, is the
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fraction of all packets reaching their final destination successfully. Measurements from an
mkps network are indicated by a subscript mkps, tmkps, ρmkps. For matters of analysis in
this chapter, we define t∆ to represent the difference between the average packet latency
values for the qcomp and mkps key predistribution schemes (t∆ = tqcomp − tmkps). We
define several protocols necessary for the study of latency and throughput in networks given
an insecure deployment environment.
• MAC protocol: The MAC protocol that we use in this chapter is a simple two-hop
ready-to-send/clear-to-send (RTS/CTS) protocol based on [82]. The protocol has
three steps: RTS phase, CTS phase and a transmit (TX) phase . The time it takes
to complete one round of these three phases is defined to be one time epoch. Packet
latencies in this work will be measured in time epochs. In the RTS phase, each node
who has a packet in its buffer to send, transmits an RTS packet. Each RTS packet is
sent at a random time, and the length of the RTS window is chosen to be sufficient to
have RTS collisions with low probability. In the CTS phase, each node responds with
a CTS to at most one requesting neighbor node. Nodes that receive a CTS from all
of its neighbors are permitted to send a packet in the TX phase. The protocol allows
all transmitting nodes to send without any of its two-hop neighbors interfering with
its transmission.
• Packet transmission model: As stated previously, we are measuring the ability
of networks to transmit packets in a data-gathering scenario. A node in the network
detects a particular event and generates information packets to report it back to the
sink node in a multi-hop fashion. We define an event to be represented by one packet
randomly generated at a random node. The generation of these events is determined
by a Poisson process with a network-wide arrival rate of λ packets per time unit. Each
node maintains a packet buffer for storage of unsent packets.
This rate of event generation, λ, can also be considered as the throughput for a
particular network instance. We also define the maximum achievable throughput to
be the λ for which a network is able to provide a t and average packet buffer length that
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is not growing unboundedly. For the maximum achievable throughput of a network,
we define this property to be λmax. We define the difference in maximum achievable
throughput between qcomp and mkps by λ∆ = λqcomp − λmkps.
In actual network operations, we expect that the generation of events are correlated.
Nodes in close proximity presumably detect the same event. In addition to the ge-
ographic correlation to event generation, these events will be temporally correlated.
However, this is left for future consideration, as we solely consider the even generation
to occur uniformly randomly throughout the network. Additionally, events are only
generated at nodes that are still part of the network, so there are no events being
generated at compromised nodes.
• Routing protocol: Given the data-gathering task of the network, we consider rout-
ing protocols to relay the generated packets to the sink node. A straight-forward
method to accomplish this is to use a geographic routing approach [53, 57, 72, 84, 88,
90, 103]. Packets are routed through the network by forwarding the packet progres-
sively closer to the sink node based on position information of the nodes. We also
assume that nodes will be able to find a legitimate node to forward packets, if one
exists.
• Adversarial model: The adversary we consider is the node compromise attacker,
the same as in Chapter 4. The attacker randomly compromises nodes in the network,
accumulating nodes and the keys found in these nodes. Any link in the network is
compromised if the adversary has obtained every key used to establish that particular
link. Nodes and links that are compromised are no longer available for the network to
use. The fraction of the network compromised is pc and the rate of link compromise
is pℓ. The resulting random graph model we consider is the compromised secure
connectivity graph, G(n, r, pk, pc).
These various protocols and models have been proposed to be suitable for use in wire-
less sensor networks. Although there may be more attractive alternatives, the goal of this
research is to analyze key predistribution schemes applied to wireless sensor networks and
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their resilience to node-compromise attacks. By using the same protocols for each key
predistribution alternative, we can compare the relative performance between key predis-
tribution schemes. There are no biases towards any of the key predistribution schemes for
any of these defined network protocols.
5.3 Packet transmission in networks with node-compromise attacks
We have simulated several networking scenarios to present the resilience of packet latency
and achievable throughput in networks with regard to node-compromise attacks. We con-
sider a network of n = 500 nodes and fix a communication radius that is sufficient to provide
initial connectivity in the network according to the results in Section 4.4.2. The networks
use either qcomp and mkps, where both the memory used in each node and the probability
of secure link connectivity between two nodes is equivalent. We examine node-compromise
attacks on the network that will compromise secure links formed by the respective key pre-
distribution schemes. In Table 5.1, we consider several pairs of networks using qcomp and
mkps with parameters set to have equal pk.
Table 5.1: Network parameters for qcomp and mkps key predistribution for latency
simulations.
QCOMP(n,q,m,P) pk
qcomp(500, 1, 20, 4620) 0.083
qcomp(500, 1, 30, 21550) 0.041
qcomp(500, 1, 40, 61880) 0.025
MKPS(n,d, t) pk
mkps(500, 2, 9) 0.083
mkps(500, 3, 9) 0.041
mkps(500, 4, 9) 0.025
5.3.1 Resilience of packet latency to node compromise attacks
We see that the resilience of packet latency behaves similarly to the rate of link compromise
in these networks. The first results we present are the average packet latencies,t, for the
networks as a function of the fraction of the network compromised, pc. Figure 5.1 and
Figure 5.2 show the average packet latency and packet reliability as function of pc for
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mkps(500, 2, 9) and qcomp(500, 1, 20, 4620), where pk = .083. The event traffic rate is
λ = 0.10. In this instance, the communication range of the nodes is chosen to be r(n) = 0.25.
As nodes and links from the initial routes become compromised, packet latency increases
and packet reliability begin to degrade. Packet latencies are increased as nodes are forced to
route through suboptimal paths. Packet reliability begins to degrade as some of the nodes
are unable to find a path to route their packets back to the sink node.
We note that in Figure 5.1, the initial average packet latencies are equal tqcomp = tmkps.
This matches our results from Chapter 4 for secure connectivity with G(n, r, pk). This result
verifies the property that two wireless sensor networks with comparable n, r, and pk provide
equal average packet latencies in the data-gathering scenario. The result in Chapter 4 that
this matches is the communication range required for network connectivity being the same
for networks of equal n and pk. The property of having equal initial t is also present in
Figures 5.3 and 5.5.
Given an initial t, we are now able to consider the resilience of the network to node-
compromise attacks. Specifically, we are interested in looking at the rate of link-compromise
in the key predistribution schemes for these networks and its effect on packet latencies. As
seen in Figure 5.1, the average latency of mkps grows unboundedly at pk = 0.25 while
qcomp is able to provide bounded latency until pk = 0.35. This matches the resiliency-
connectivity results, where r(n)→∞ for mkps(500, 2, 9) at pc ≈ 0.15. This relationship to
the the packet latency is that as r(n) approaches infinity, the network loses its connectivity.
This ultimately results in the latency to increase.
Plots are shown in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 for the network instances of mkps(500, 3, 9) and
qcomp(500, 1, 30, 21550), where pk = .083 and λ = 0.10. Here, r(n) is chosen to be 0.45.
Simulation results are also shown for mkps(500, 4, 9) and qcomp(500, 1, 40, 61880), where
pk = .025. The arrival rate of the events is λ = 0.10 in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6. For
the third network scenario, r(n) is chosen to be 0.65. These results match the resiliency-
connectivity results in Chapter 4, as evident from the results in Figures 5.1 - 5.6. The
resilience of the rate of link-compromise against the node-compromise attack is consistent
with a smaller increase in average packet latency as a function of pc.
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Figure 5.1: t vs. pc for mkps(500, 2, 9) and qcomp(500, 1, 20, 4620) with λ = 0.10 and
r = 0.5.
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Figure 5.2: ρ vs. pc for mkps(500, 2, 9) and qcomp(500, 1, 20, 4620) with λ = 0.10 and
r = 0.5.
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Figure 5.3: t vs. pc for mkps(500, 3, 9) and qcomp(500, 1, 30, 21550) with λ = 0.10 and
r = 0.6.
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Figure 5.4: ρ vs. pc for mkps(500, 3, 9) and qcomp(500, 1, 30, 21550) with λ = 0.10 and
r = 0.6.
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Figure 5.5: t vs. pc for mkps(500, 4, 9) and qcomp(500, 1, 40, 61880) with λ = 0.20 and
r = 0.75.
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Figure 5.6: ρ vs. pc for mkps(500, 4, 9) and qcomp(500, 1, 40, 61880) with λ = 0.20 and
r = 0.75.
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5.3.2 Resilience of maximum achievable throughput to node compromise at-
tacks
Using the results from Section 5.3.1, we measure the maximum throughput, λmax, that a
network is able to provide bounded packet latency. Given λ > λmax, the node buffers begin
to increase as events are generated faster than the network can route packets to the sink.
We determine λmax for the three instances of qcomp and mkps.
Figures 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9 show λmax versus pc for the three pairs of networks that we have
considered. These plots show the increased resilience of λmax to node-compromise attacks
for the mkps scheme for when d = {3, 4} as compared with qcomp. In Figure 5.7, the
qcomp network is able to handle the same λmax for values of pc that are 0.10 higher than
the mkps network. However, in Figures 5.8 and 5.9, this property shows that mkps where
d = {3, 4}, the λMAX is more resilient to node-compromise attacks than qcomp. Given
increased link resilience, it is expected that the maximum achievable throughput in these
networks demonstrates similar gains in performance when comparing mkps with qcomp.
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Figure 5.7: λmax vs. pc for mkps(500, 2, 9) and qcomp(500, 1, 20, 4620) with r = 0.5.
5.3.3 Relationship between latency resilience and node location
We present another interpretation of measuring packet latency as a function of node com-
promise attacks. In this section, we consider packet latency as a function of the distance
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Figure 5.8: λmax vs. pc for mkps(500, 3, 9) and qcomp(500, 1, 30, 21550) with r = 0.6.
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Figure 5.9: λmax vs. pc for mkps(500, 4, 9) and qcomp(500, 1, 40, 61880) with r = 0.75.
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from the sink, dsink. In normal networking situations, it is expected that the latency of
packets originating farther away from the sink will be higher than those closer to the sink
node. We consider the average packet latency of events generated at nodes in 0.1-unit in-
crements from the sink node. Our results do, in fact, show a relative increase in packet
latency as we consider regions in the network farther from the sink node. We include the
node compromise attack into consideration of packet latency as a function of distance. This
section analyzes the average packet latency of packets originating from a specific distance
from the sink and obtaining relative measures of the resilience of the latency of these packets
as a function of pc.
We examine packet latency for specific instances of networking situations. In Figure 5.10,
we consider qcomp(500, 1, 30, 21550) and mkps(500, 3, 9) with λ = 0.05 and pc = 0.10.
For all distances from the sink node, t∆ > 0, indicating that mkps is slightly improved
compared to qcomp at these parameters. However, in the case of mkps where d = 4, there
is a significant gain with respect to t∆, as shown in Figure 5.11. For mkps(500, 4, 9) and
qcomp(500, 1, 40, 61880) with λ = 0.05 and pc = 0.20, t∆ ≥ 3 for all distances from the
sink node. The gain is dependent upon the values of pc and λ. For instance, t∆ is greater in
Figure 5.11 than Figure 5.10 because of the higher value of d, but also for the higher value
of pc. These results of packet latencies as a function of dsink match our results pertaining
to globally average packet latencies, t.
5.3.4 Tradeoffs with MKPS key predistribution
We have seen results for the resilience of packet latency in wireless networks in response
to node-compromise attacks. The mkps key predistribution scheme was shown to provide
improved resilience to node-compromise attacks. This section considers the tradeoffs when
varying the dimension parameter, d. We have compared the performance of two mkps
networks with similar memory m, but varying pk. Changing the dimension of mkps effects
pk. Additionally, we have chosen r(n) in each case to be sufficiently large enough to provide
a connected network. We have chosen mkps networks with the parameters listed in Table
For this section, we use mkps(500, 2, 9) with r = 0.5 and mkps(500, 4, 4) with r = 0.75.
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Figure 5.10: t vs. dsink for mkps(500, 3, 9) and qcomp(500, 1, 30, 21550) with λ = 0.05
and pc = 0.10.
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Figure 5.11: t vs. dsink for mkps(500, 4, 9) and qcomp(500, 1, 40, 61800) with λ = 0.05
and pc = 0.20.
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The mkps for d = 2 has pk = 0.083, and for d = 2, it has pk = 0.025. We note that m = 20
for both of these instances.
Increasing d results in a greater resilience to the node-compromise attack. Links are
much more resilient to the node-compromise attack at an increased d; therefore, the network
is able to stay connected and successfully route packets to the sink. This is shown in Figure
5.12, where λmax vs. pc is shown. However, the tradeoff is that the overall packet latency t
is increased for higher dimension. In some cases t∆ = 2. Figure 5.13 shows the difference
in the average packet latency for the two networks for λ = 0.05. The dimension parameter
allows a network to be designed for the maximum achievable throughput, λmax to have an
increased resilience against node-compromise attacks at the cost of an increased t.
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Figure 5.12: λmax vs. pc to compare the effect of the d parameter in mkps.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter we have analyzed the resilience of packet latency in a data-gathering scenario.
We extended the work of Chapter 4 to address the temporal aspects of networking to
enable the measurement of average packet latency and maximum achievable throughput.
We considered key predistribution schemes and wireless sensor networks and examined the
resilience of latency and throughput as a function of node compromise attacks.
Furthermore, we compared mkps and qcomp and determined that mkps for d = {3, 4}
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Figure 5.13: t vs λ to compare the effect of the d parameter in mkps.
possesses superior resilience with respect to average packet latency and maximum achievable
throughput. Also, we have analyzed packet latencies with respect to their distance from the
sink node. We obtained similar results when comparing mkps and qcomp in this approach
as well. Furthermore, the d parameter in mkps increases the resilience of a network to node-
compromise attacks with the cost of an increased average packet latency. This investigation
provided an initial treatment of the resilience of packet latency and achievable throughput
for key predistribution schemes applied to wireless sensor networks.
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CHAPTER VI
KEY PREDISTRIBUTION SCHEMES AND THEIR RESILIENCE TO
NODE-SPOOFING ATTACKS
6.1 Introduction
Thus far, we have considered issues pertaining to link security and secure connectivity
in wireless sensor networks. These investigations have studied key predistribution tech-
niques to provide secure keys for use in communication links in the network. Based on
the key predistribution technique used, the networks offer some amount of resistance to
node-compromise attacks in terms of link security. As the number of compromised nodes
grows, the adversary increases its control over the links in the network. As the adversary
compromises communication links in the network, he is able to eavesdrop on the trans-
mitted data without having to directly compromise either of the end nodes of the link.
Depending on the resources and capability of the adversary, the network is vulnerable to a
class of more powerful attacks, ultimately allowing the adversary to have a greater effect
on the reliability and availability of data in the network. A stronger malicious attack on
sensor networks is if the adversary is able to masquerade as a legitimate node and perform
malicious tasks without being detected. These tasks range from simple packet dropping
and modification to the creation of worm holes and sink holes that alter the flow of packets
through the network. This class of attack is called the node-spoofing attack. This chapter
provides a study of node-spoofing attacks on the key predistribution schemes for wireless
sensor networks.
We present an analysis of node-spoofing attacks in wireless networks for various key
predistribution schemes. By considering various adversarial models for node-spoofing, we
present new approaches to key predistribution by attempting to uniformly distribute the
keys in the nodes of the network, which results in increased resilience against node-spoofing
attacks. We present background details in Section 6.2, which include the network models
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and notation used and a summary of work related to key predistribution schemes and secu-
rity in wireless sensor networks. Section 6.3 presents several adversarial models considered
in this chapter. These are specific to key predistribution schemes. We propose the regular
key predistribution scheme and the regular threshold key predistribution scheme in Section
6.4. Analysis and simulations results are included in this section, which compares various
proposed and existing key predistribution schemes.
6.2 Preliminaries
This section describes the network and key management models used in our analysis. Some
of the notations used are described in Section 6.1. We assume a uniformly random de-
ployment of n nodes into a field of unit area. Each node is capable of transmitting with
communication radius r. In terms of key predistribution schemes applied to the network,
each node is able to store m units of key information.
For the key predistribution scheme, there is a publicly-known pseudo-random function
fID(vi) = Ki which maps the node identity to the key identities within each node. This is
used after the neighborhood discovery phase, when the nodes establish session keys. Node
identities are exchanged in the neighborhood discovery phase. A node vi determines with
which of its neighboring nodes, vj ∈ N(vi), it can form a secure link by using fID(vj) = Kj ∀
vj ∈ N(vi) to determine if there are any shared keys. The identity space of fID(·) takes node
identities of size n. For node-spoofing attacks in this chapter, we allow n node identities for
the adversary to attempt to spoof. It is possible to design the network to recognize multiple
fID(·) functions for future deployments.
With regard to the node-compromise attacks, we consider x compromised nodes or the
fraction, pc, of compromised nodes in the network. The security parameters we consider
are the probability of link-compromise, pℓ, and the probability of node-spoofing, px. These
probabilities are described in further detail in Section 6.3.
6.2.1 Related work
This section documents recent developments related to this work in this chapter. First, we
state the proposed key predistribution schemes for wireless sensor networks that we consider
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Table 6.1: Network parameters for node-spoofing attacks on wireless sensor networks
n Number of nodes in the network
m Number of memory units in each node
vi Node with identity i
N(vi) Neighborhood of node i
Ki Key ring of node i
kji The jth key in the key ring of node i
kij = kji Shared keys between node i and j
P Key pool size
P ′ Compromised key pool
PN(vi) Key pool of neighborhood of vi
λ Key threshold
#(k) Number of occurrences of key k
base(n,m, P ) A network using random KPS
reg(n,m, P ) A network using regular KPS
tkey(n,m, λ, P ) a network using threshold KPS
pk Probability of establishing a secure key between any two
nodes
pc Fraction of the network compromised
pℓ Probability of link-compromise
px Probability of successful node-spoof
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in this chapter. Second, we briefly cover the possible adversarial attacks once a node can
be spoofed.
There are several proposed methods for key management schemes for wireless sensor
networks that are used in this chapter. Eschenauer [35] provides one of the original works on
key predistribution schemes for sensor networks, which is called random key predistribution.
Chan [13] extends this scheme to propose a q-composite scheme where q common keys are
required to establish a secure link. We note that the Eschenauer scheme is equivalent to the
q-composite scheme when q = 1. For this chapter, we call the random key predistribution
scheme the base key predistribution scheme. Additionally, q = 1 is solely considered, as
the qcomp link security is significantly degraded for q > 1. This is discussed in Chapter 4.
and this is justified in subsequent sections when necessary. A unique instance of a network
implementing the base key predistribution scheme is described by base(n,m, P ).
We also consider a key predistribution scheme by Du [32] that is based on a key predis-
tribution scheme proposed by Blom [8]. This scheme possesses a λ-secure property, where
λ is the threshold for each key. This property requires the adversary to gather λ+1 shares
of a single polynomial to compromise one key. Delgosha [26] proposed a similar scheme
based on multivariate symmetric polynomials representing keys. By requiring b − 1 poly-
nomials to be shared in order to establish a secure key, the threshold for each polynomial
becomes λ =
(
t+b−1
b−1
)
where t is the order of the polynomial. We denote networks using
these schemes as tkey networks, which can be uniquely described by tkey(n,m, λ, P ). If
the total memory of the node is m, then m = τ(λ+ 1). Each node is preloaded with τ key
shares.
Karlof [52] documents several malicious attacks on wireless sensor networks, including
spoofed information, selective forwarding, wormhole, sinkhole, and Sybil attacks [30]. This
work also establishes the notion of a mote-class attacker and a laptop-class attacker, two
distinctions of the level of capability the adversary possess. Additionally, they classify
attackers as being outsiders or insiders. Eavesdropping is one example of an outsider attack,
while packet dropping is considered to be an insider attack. A spoofed node is required for
the insider attacks. Newsome [71] presents the node-spoofing attack in the context of the
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Sybil attack on the random key predistribution scheme. In terms of detecting spoofed nodes,
Parno [75] develops line multicast methods to detect the presence of a node in two positions
in the network. These methods still require significant overhead to employ. We consider
node-spoofing attacks on the key predistribution schemes for wireless sensor networks. With
this ability, the adversary is then able to mount attacks of significant threat to the integrity
of the network.
6.2.2 Overview of contribution
We examine the property of node-spoofing in wireless sensor networks relative to key pre-
distribution schemes. Currently, the design of security schemes for wireless networks lies in
the link security. We investigate node-spoofing as it relates to key predistribution schemes.
In this chapter, we present analysis of node-spoofing in sensor networks with respect to the
probability of secure key establishment, pk. This provides a clear and comparable way to
assess the quality of the KPS against this attack. We propose variants to the random key
predistribution scheme (base), which provide improved resilience to node-spoofing attacks
on wireless sensor networks. First, we propose regular key predistribution, which enforces
a rule that requires each key in the key pool to be stored the same number of nodes. We
then introduce the threshold concept to the regular KPS to achieve greater resilience of the
KPS against node-spoofing attacks.
6.3 Link and node security in key predistribution schemes
The adversary that we consider in these situations is able to compromise nodes in the
network and accumulate the key information of each compromised node. The adversary
is then able to launch attacks based on this information. For this chapter, the network
is susceptible to link-compromise and node-spoofing attacks based on the fraction of the
nodes compromised in the deployed network, pc. For each node that is compromised, the
adversary is able to accumulate all the keys associated with the node.
Probability of link-compromise, pℓ: Given that the adversary has captured pc of the
network, it has obtained some fraction P ′ of the whole key space P . A link kij is considered
to be compromised if the adversary has obtained every key used to establish the link. In
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other words, if kij ∈ P ′, then kij is compromised.
Probability of node-spoof, px: With the deployment of the network, nodes are vul-
nerable to direct compromise from the deployment field. The adversary will redeploy these
compromised nodes and use them for malicious purposes. Also, an adversary may compro-
mise nodes and obtain enough key information to present a node identity identical to an
already deployed node, which has not been compromised itself. The adversarial model we
choose is one that examines the resilience against node-spoofing through indirect means.
The nodes that are directly compromised are not considered for a potential node-spoof, but
it is assumed that the adversary has recovered all key information inside these nodes. The
adversary will attempt to spoof a node which has not been directly compromised.
We consider a node to be successfully spoofed when the adversary selects a particular
node identity v′x and deploys it into an area of the network and 1) passes validation tests
from its direct neighbors and 2) establishes a secure link with at least one of its neighbors.
A node id vx′ is chosen to be spoofed, and the adversary will have t of the m keys in the
key ring Kx′ . The spoofed node is detected if the neighborhood N(vx′) has any of the m− t
keys in Kx′ the spoofed node does not have. The probability that the spoofed node is able
to pass the neighborhood validation test is px.
We consider a different node-spoofing adversarial model than compared to [71]. We
allow the adversary to attempt to spoof any of the deployed nodes in the network that
he has not compromised directly. Newsome [71] allows the adversary to spoof any a node
identity that is a combination of m keys for the random key predistribution scheme. In our
work, we limit the space of nodes that can be spoofed to those that are deployed.
6.3.1 Adversarial models for the node-spoofing attack
We propose different knowledge models for the adversary with regard to node-spoofing
attacks. The idea of the mote-class attacker and the laptop-class attacker from [52] are
considered with these knowledge models for the node-spoofing attack. We define three
adversarial models that give the adversary specific capabilities and goals, which determine
the subset of nodes that the adversary captures. We assume that the adversary selects its
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next node to compromise according to a rule determined by its attack model.
6.3.1.1 Random Attack
We consider the weakest variety of adversarial attack and call it the random attack. In this
situation, there is a mote-class attacker, whom does not have knowledge of node positions
or network deployment topology. Therefore, this attacker is only capable of randomly
compromising nodes throughout the network. The next node compromised, vx, by the
adversary according to the random attack model is defined as
vx = vi, where i = Γ(n), (6.1)
where Γ(n) is a uniformly random selection of one of the n(1− pc) remaining nodes. Nodes
are randomly selected from the nodes remaining in the network. After the compromise
of a subset of the nodes in the network, the adversary attempts to spoof a random node
identity node in a random location of the network. We call the probability of a successful
node-spoofing attack using the random attack model to be px,rand.
6.3.1.2 Optimized Attack
We consider a more capable adversary by allowing the attacker to have a global understand-
ing of the topology of the wireless sensor network along with the location and identities of
all deployed nodes. We call attacks with this knowledge and capability the optimized at-
tack. In terms of the key predistribution scheme, this attack represents the adversary that
goes after the most commonly occurring keys in the network. The compromise of nodes in
this way optimally reduces the average number of keys in each node. The optimized attack
compromises nodes by removing the maximal number of keys from the network with each
successive node capture. The next node to be captured vx is determined by maximizing the
following expression
vx = vi, where i = argmax
i
m∑
j=1
#
(
kjvi
)
. (6.2)
This adversary is able to achieve a higher average probability of a successful node-spoof
than the random attack model, so px,opt > px,rand.
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6.3.1.3 Identity-optimized Attack
We consider an attack model that defines a more specific goal for the adversary. We call this
attack model the identity-optimized attack. In this situation, the adversary has identified
one or several specific node identities to attempt to spoof.
The adversary then compromises nodes, not including those that it wants to spoof, to
maximize its chances of a successful spoof of the identified nodes. If the adversary is trying
to spoof χ node identities, the rule to determine the next node to compromise is defined by
vx = vi, where i = argmax
i
χ∑
j=1
| (kj ∩ ki) |. (6.3)
The difference between the optimized attack and the identity-optimized attack is that
the optimized attack is attempting to maximize the average node-spoofing probability for
the entire set of deployed nodes. The identity-optimized attack is simply trying to maximize
its chances of compromising this small subset of nodes. We expect this variety of attack to
be the most threatening to key predistribution schemes applied to sensor networks.
6.4 Node-spoofing and key predistribution schemes
This section presents two key predistribution schemes for use in wireless sensor networks
to increase the resilience of a network to the node-spoofing attack. We present the regular
key predistribution scheme and the threshold key predistribution scheme, which are two
key predistribution schemes that take advantage of a uniform distribution of keys among
the nodes in the network. In the original random key predistribution, each key is present
in a random number of nodes in the network for any deployment. In a situation where the
adversary is able to optimally compromise nodes, base is vulnerable. The adversary will
be able to select nodes that possess the most frequently occurring keys in the network. We
describe both of these key predistribution schemes and then provide comparisons of the
random key predistribution to our proposed schemes.
6.4.1 Regular key predistribution
Given a non-uniform distribution of keys in the network, an adversarial attack that is able
to compromise the most commonly occurring keys in the network will quickly acquire a
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significant portion of the key pool. We propose that every key is required to be present
in the same number of nodes in the network. In other words, every key is used the same
number of times for a particular network instance. Intuitively, we can see vulnerabilities
in key distribution schemes that have a severe non-uniformity in the distribution of keys.
An extreme example of this is the use of a global key. Not only will the adversary be
able to compromise a significant portion of links by compromising keys that are used most
frequently, the adversary will improve its chances of spoofing nodes that are identified by
these keys as well. Therefore, by forcing the distribution of the keys in the network to
be uniform, this may potentially improve the security against link-compromise and node-
spoofing.
We present the regular random key predistribution scheme, which implements this ap-
proach. This key predistribution scheme is accomplished and illustrated with a Tanner
graph, a graph-theoretic construct used to generate Low-Density Parity-Check (LDPC)
codes. Figure 6.1 shows this structure, where the sensor nodes are shown by the vertices
{v1, v2, . . . , vn}, and the keys are shown by the vertices {k1, k2, . . . , kP }. Here, there are m
edges incident to each node vertex, xi, which corresponds to the m keys for each node, xi.
Additionally, the regular key predistribution scheme places a requirement that each key be
used an equivalent number of times, a, where Pa = nm. In cases where we are given n,m,
and P and a is not an integer, we allow keys to be used a and a+1 times. The structure of
the regular KPS is shown in Figure 6.1, where there are a edges incident to each key vertex
ki and m adjacent to each node vertex vi.
Similar to reg, a unique instance of the regular key predistribution scheme is defined
by reg(n,m, P ). An upper bound for the probability of secure key establishment is
pk,reg ≤
P
(
a
2
)(
n
2
) . (6.4)
The probability of secure key establishment for reg compared to base is that given equiv-
alent n,m, and P , pk,base > pk,reg.
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Figure 6.1: Illustration of the key assignment for the regular key predistribution scheme.
6.4.2 Threshold key predistribution
In this section, we attempt to further increase the resilience of key predistribution schemes
against node-spoofing attacks by adding threshold security to reg. In this situation, we
implement the same Tanner graph-based key assignment to the nodes, but each key is
represented by a λ-secure polynomial as used in [26, 32]. We define this threshold key
predistribution scheme by tkey. As mentioned earlier, each node is given key shares from
τ polynomials, where τ = ⌊ m
λ+1⌋ and λ is the threshold. Key shares are assigned to nodes
in the tkey KPS in the same fashion as the polynomials in the multivariate symmetric
polynomial key predistribution for d = 2. Each key ki is represented by a two-variable
polynomial of dimension λ, fi(x1, x2) =
∑λ
j=0 γjx
jyλ−j , where there are a key shares for
each key ki = {ki(1), ki(2), . . . ki(a)}. For a given key share k1i(α) in node vi, the node is given
the coefficients to the single variable polynomial, fki(k
1
i(α), y2). The relationship between
the keys, key shares and key polynomials for key ki is illustrated in 6.2. Any two nodes who
have a key share from the same key can establish a secure link by using these key shares
to evaluate the corresponding single variable symmetric polynomial, fki(ki(α1), ki(α2)). We
note that each stored polynomial occupies λ+ 1 units of memory in each node.
For example, we demonstrate how two nodes vi, vj can establish a secure link in a tkey
network. The steps are shown in Table 6.2. Given that the key shares in each node are
(k1
i(α1)
, k2
i(α2)
, . . . kτ
i(ατ )
) for vi and (k
1
j(α1)
, k2
j(α2)
, . . . kτ
j(ατ )
) for vj , we assume that these two
nodes have key shares from the same key, kρ, so kρ = k
1
j = k
τ
i . Further, in the predistribution
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ki
ki(1)
ki(2)
ki(a)
⇒ fi(ki(1), y2)
⇒ fi(ki(2), y2)
⇒ fi(ki(a), y2)
...
...
Figure 6.2: Illustration of key ki and its corresponding key shares and polynomials for the
threshold key predistribution scheme.
Table 6.2: Process of establishing a secure link between nodes vi, vj in the tkey key
predistribution scheme
node vi node vj
(k1
i(α1)
, k2
i(α2)
, . . . kτ
i(ατ )
) −→
←− (k1
j(α1)
, k2
j(α2)
, . . . kτ
j(ατ )
)
Assume kρ = k
1
j = k
τ
i .
fkρ(k
τ
i(ατ )
, y2) = fkρ(k
1
j(α1)
, y2)
fkρ(k
τ
i(ατ )
, k1j(α1)) = fkρ(k
1
j(α1)
, kτi(ατ ))
kij = fkρ(k
1
j(α1)
, kτi(ατ ))
phase of tkey, both of the nodes are preloaded with the coefficients to the single variable
polynomial corresponding to the same key, fkρ(k
1
i(ατ )
, y2) and fkρ(k
τ
j(α1)
, y2). Because of
the symmetric property of the polynomials, nodes vi, vj both arrive at the same key by
evaluating fkρ(·) at the key share from the other node to arrive at the key, fkρ(k1i(ατ ), kτj(α1)).
The result is a regular key distribution that has keys with the λ-secure property, tkey.
Although the number of keys in each node is reduced, we expect an increased resilience to
node-spoofing attacks with the use of λ-secure polynomials. The probability of secure key
establishment is equivalent to the reg scheme, pk,tkey = pk(reg). We note that this scheme
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is a regular version of [32].
6.5 Evaluation of the regular key predistribution schemes
We now examine the performance of the proposed key predistribution schemes for wire-
less sensor networks. First, we motivate the proposed key predistribution schemes with a
comparison of the distribution of keys between base and reg. Second, we examine the link-
compromise property of the base, reg, and tkey key predistribution schemes. We see that
the uniformity in the distribution of the keys in the network benefits the link-compromise
property. Then, we examine the node-spoofing attack on the key predistribution schemes
for wireless sensor networks. We consider the node-spoofing attacks from the perspective of
the adversarial models described in Section 6.3. We show results comparing the resilience
of the node-spoof attack for networks using base, reg, and tkey.
6.5.1 Vulnerability from the distribution of keys
First, we look at the distribution of the keys in base. Given the random assignment of
keys within the network, the non-uniform distribution of the keys in base is illustrated in
Figure 6.3. The solid line represents the distribution of the keys in base(1000, 50, 1000)
and the dashed line represents reg(1000, 50, 1000). Although pk,reg is reduced compared
to pk,base for the same P , we see that this property has a direct influence on the probability
of link-compromise and node-spoofing. The size of the key pool P required to have pk
for a network of n = 1000 and m = 100 is shown for base and reg in Figure 6.4. the
difference in the key pool size increases as pk decreases. In fact, base(1000, 100, 100000)
and reg(1000, 100, 50000) both have pk = 0.10, where there is a much smaller discrepancy
between networks with pk = 0.78 in base(1000, 100, 7000) and reg(1000, 100, 6250).
The non-uniform distribution of keys in the network allows the adversary to compro-
mise the keys that occur the most number of times in the network. This affects both the
probability of node-spoofing as each key is used a uniform number of times in the network.
The adversary is initially unable to mount an optimal attack on the distribution of keys.
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Figure 6.3: Comparison of the distribution of key usage between reg and base with
n = 1000, m = 50, and P = 1000.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
x 104
BASE
REG
P
pk
Figure 6.4: Comparison of the size of the key pool, P versus the probability of secure key
establishment reg and base with n = 1000, m = 100.
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Figure 6.5: pℓ vs. pk for random key predistribution given a random node-compromise
for base(1000, 100, P )
6.5.2 Relating link-compromise and node-spoofing attacks
In our analysis of the node-spoofing attack, we use the probability of link-compromise pℓ to
determine the range of pk that the node-spoofing attacks will be considered. When looking
at pℓ for the random key predistribution scheme, networks with lower pk exhibit greater
resilience to link compromise. This property is illustrated in Figure 6.5, where pℓ vs. pk is
plotted for base(1000, 100, P ), with P varied to obtain the range of pk. The figure shows
the plots pℓ for pc = {0.05, 0.10, 0.20}. This plot suggests that considering the lower range
of pk offers more resilience to link-compromise attacks. For our investigation into node-
spoofing, we consider instances of KPS for 0.10 < pk < 0.20. This way we can examine
networks against node-spoofing while the link security is also kept high.
First, we compare the probability of link-compromise of the basic scheme base with
both of the regular key predistribution schemes, reg and tkey. As shown in Figure 6.6,
we plot the probability of link-compromise against the probability of secure key estab-
lishment for a network of n = 1000 and m = 100. The networks that we have shown
in this plot are base(1000, 100, 100000), reg(1000, 100, 50000), tkey(1000, 1, 100, 2, 8000),
and tkey(1000, 1, 100, 9, 900). The parameters for each of these key predistribution schemes
result in a network with pk = 0.10. We have shown the probability of link-compromise, pℓ,
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given a random node-compromise attack model. This shows that reg suffers a slight de-
crease in resilience to link-compromise compared to base. We also see that the networks
using tkey have an increased resilience to the link-compromise attack compared to base.
This behavior is attributed to the threshold property of the keys.
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Figure 6.6: pℓ vs. pc given a random node-compromise attack for base, reg, and
tkey(λ = [2, 9]), where pk = 0.10.
As described in Section 6.3 for the node-spoofing attack, we can define an optimal
attack with respect to the link-compromise attack. In this case, the adversary attempts to
maximize the number of links it compromises with each successive node capture. Therefore,
the rule to determine the next node to compromise for the link-optimized attack model is
defined by
vx = vi, where i = argmax
i
m∑
j=1
#
(
kji
)
. (6.5)
The link-optimal attack is illustrated in Figure 6.7, where the random attack and the
link-optimized attack, in addition to the gain realized from the optimized attack, are shown.
The gain is almost 20% at pc = 0.15. This optimal attack is revisited later in this chapter.
6.5.3 Regular key predistribution schemes and node-spoofing attacks
To illustrate the difference in node-spoofing resilience between these key predistribution
schemes, we consider the network where n = 1000, m ≤ 100. We present simulation results
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Figure 6.7: pℓ vs. pc given a random and link-optimized node-compromise attack for reg.
Gain from the link-optimized attack is also shown.
of node-spoofing in wireless sensor networks as a function of pc. In the simulations, we have
implemented reg and base, deployed a set of n nodes and removed pcn nodes according
to either the random or optimized node-compromise attack model. The communication
radius is set to r = 0.15, which is sufficient for the network to have global connectivity.
As studied in Chapter 4, the communication range required for connectivity is dependent
upon the network size and the probability of secure key establishment. Additionally, the
communication range impacts px in that the expected neighborhood size or the number
of validating nodes is equal to |Nx| = πr2n. Additionally, we compare different KPS
where pk and m are the same, allowing for a fair comparison in terms of initial network
connectivity and memory usage. We now look at the node-spoofing attack while considering
the adversarial models that Section 6.3 describes: the random, optimized, and the identity-
optimized attacks.
6.5.3.1 Analysis of the node-spoof attack on wireless sensor networks and key predis-
tribution schemes
Determining the probability of node-spoof, px, and link-compromise, pℓ, for reg and tkey
can be derived with the use of the classic balls and bins problem [95]. In the original
problem, there are N balls independently thrown intoM bins. This problem can be adapted
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to determining px and pℓ for the regular key predistribution schemes by having one bin per
key and the balls as the key shares present in the nodes. The balls represent the keys or
key shares that are compromised by the adversary. Each bin has a finite capacity of a, and
in our situation, there are exactly a balls of each key randomly distributed in the nodes.
This interpretation can be illustrated with Figure 6.1.
In this section, we determine the average probability for link-compromise and node-
spoof for the random node-compromise adversarial attack model. For reg, we consider P
bins, all with a capacity of a. Given pc, there are pcnm balls distributed into the bins. We
want to determine the expected number of bins with at least one ball in it, given pc. The
fraction of bins with a ball in it is interpreted to be P ′, the size of the compromised key
pool. Similarly for tkey, we consider P bins with capacity a, and there are pcnτ balls
distributed into the bins. We want to determine the expected number of bins with at least
λ+1 balls. Here, the fraction of bins with λ+1 balls in it is interpreted to be P ′, the number
of compromised polynomials. The derivation for these expressions is found in Appendix B.
With this expression, the probability of node-spoof can also be derived. The probability of
link-compromise for reg and tkey are defined by
pℓϕ(ψ,ϕ) =
∑a
k=ϕ
∑P−1
j=0 (−1)j
(
P−1
j
)(P−2+(ψ−k−j(a+1))
(ψ−k−j(a+1))
)
P
∑P
ℓ=0(−1)ℓ
(
P
ℓ
)(P−1+(ψ−ℓ(a+1))
(ψ−ℓ(a+1))
) , (6.6)
where pℓ,reg = pℓϕ(pcnm, 1) and pℓ,tkey = pℓϕ(pcnτ, λ+ 1).
For the probability of node-spoof, px, we use the result of pℓ. The success of the node-
spoofing attack is discussed in 6.3. First, we determine the probability that the adversary
has compromised i of the m keys for the node, kvi , that it is attempting to spoof (for tkey,
we substitute τ for m). We define this as
Pr(|kvi ∩ P ′| = i) =
(
m
i
)
(px)
i(1− px)m−i. (6.7)
Second, we determine the probability that the spoofed node passes the validation step,
given that the adversary has i of the m keys of the adversary. The validation test is passed
if the neighborhood does not possess any of the m− i keys that the adversary does not have
for the node, kvi . The keys in the neighborhood is defined to be PNvi , and the keys that
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the adversary does not have is the complement of the compromised key pool, (P ′)c. The
probability that the spoofed node passes the validation test from the neighbors is bounded
by
Pr([(P ′)c ∩ kvi ] ∩ PN(vi) = ∅ | |kvi ∩ P ′| = i) ≤
(
πr2(a− 1)(m− i)
n
)
. (6.8)
From (6.7) and (6.8), we can determine the probability of a successful node-spoof attack
for the regular key predistribution schemes. An upper-bound for this probability can be
described by the following
px = Pr(|kvi ∩ P ′| = i)Pr([(P ′)c ∩ kvi ] ∩ PN(vi) = ∅ | |kvi ∩ P ′| = i)
px ≤
m∑
i=1
(
m
i
)
(pℓϕ(ψ,ϕ))
i(1− pℓϕ(ψ,ϕ))m−i
(
πr2(a− 1)(m− i)
n
)
. (6.9)
6.5.3.2 Results for node-spoofing attacks with a random/optimized adversary
When considering the random and optimized adversarial node-compromise models, the
probability of a successful node-spoofing attack is interpreted to be the average probability
of an adversary to spoof a node in a random location in the network. We consider both the
random node-compromise attack model and the optimized node-spoofing attack.
Figures 6.8 and 6.9 show the fraction of the network compromised pc required for the
adversary to have a probability of a successful node-spoof of px = 0.10 for values of the
probability of secure key establishment, 0.10 < pk < 0.25. Figure 6.8 depicts the node-
spoofing attack for the random adversarial attack model, and Figure 6.9 shows the same for
the optimized node-compromise adversarial model. We note that the gain of the adversary
by being able to optimally compromise nodes for the sake of the node-spoofing attack is
nearly 5% for base and reg, and 10% for both tkey networks. We interpret the gain to be
the reduction in the percentage of the network the adversary has to compromise to achieve
px = 0.10.
When comparing the resilience of the node-spoofing attack for base and reg, the simu-
lation results show that base has a higher vulnerability than reg for both of the adversarial
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Figure 6.8: pc vs. pk for the adversary to have a 10% chance of a successful node-spoof
given a random node-compromise adversarial model for networks with parameters n = 1000
and m = 100 and using base, reg, and tkey[λ = 2, 9].
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Figure 6.9: pc vs. pk for the adversary to have a 10% chance of a successful node-
spoof given an optimized node-compromise adversarial model for networks with parameters
n = 1000 and m = 100 and using base, reg, and tkey[λ = 2, 9].
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models. When pk = 0.10, reg requires 25% more nodes to be compromised than base to
achieve px = 0.10. These figures also show the increased resilience to the node-spoofing
attack of tkey compared to both reg and base. For pk = 0.10, tkey(λ = 9) requires
0.40 more of the network to be compromised compared to base to achieve px = 0.10. This
result is attributed to the λ-secure property for each key used in tkey. Additionally, the
plots of px versus pc for pk = 0.10 are shown in Figure 6.10, for the random attack model,
and in Figure 6.11, for the optimized attack model. These results correspond to the pre-
vious discussion that examined the fraction of the network required to be compromised
in order for the adversary to have a certain probability of spoof a node successfully. The
plots for are shown for the four instances of key predistribution schemes: base, reg, and
tkey(λ = [2, 9]).
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Figure 6.10: px vs. pc given random node compromises for base, reg, and tkey[λ = 2, 9]
for n = 1000 and m = 100.
6.5.3.3 Maximizing λ for TKEY
In terms of tkey, we are able to adjust the λ parameter while keeping pk and m the same.
We can adjust this parameter to optimize the resilience of the network against the node-
spoofing attack. We optimize this parameter by determining the value of λ that results in
the adversary to compromise the greatest number of nodes in the networking scenario we
have been considering. For the optimal node-compromise attack, we examine the required
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Figure 6.11: px vs. pc given optimized node compromises for base, reg, and tkey[λ =
2, 9] for n = 1000 and m = 100.
fraction pc of the network required to give the adversary a 10% chance to successfully spoof
a node as a function of the threshold parameter, λ. We call the value of λ that maximizes
the network against the node-spoofing attack to be λMAX . For n = 1000, m = 100, and
px = 0.10, the network is most resilient to the node-spoofing attack with λMAX = 9 This
result is shown in Figure 6.12. The value of λMAX depends on the network parameters
and the probability of successful node-spoof for which it is defined. For example, given
the initial scenario, if the tkey key predistribution parameters are chosen with px = 0.25,
choosing λMAX = 9 may result in the network providing sub-optimal resilience against the
node-spoof attack. This sub-optimal behavior is due to the threshold behavior of px,tkey.
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λ
Figure 6.12: pc vs. λ for an optimized node-compromise adversarial model.
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6.5.3.4 Results for node-spoofing attacks with an identity-optimized adversary
We also consider the identity-optimized adversarial model. This attack establishes a scenario
where the adversary is attempting to spoof χ specific node identities. The adversary may
have identified a specific set of nodes that it aims to control. These nodes may be attractive
nodes in the routing dynamics, meaning that these nodes are close to the base station, and
nodes in the network are attempting to route their packets to these nodes as fast as possible.
Additionally, successful spoofing of these nodes may allow the adversary to alter the routes
in the network advertising the presence of these nodes in other locations of the network.
This results in packets being routed through and to suboptimal routes and locations. This
decreases packet reliability and increases packet delivery rates. Further, more sophisticated
attacks such as sinkhole or blackhole attacks could be implemented as well.
We look at the identity-optimized attack for base, reg, and tkey[2, 9] and determine
the average fraction of the network required to be compromised in order to spoof the
targeted nodes. The spoofed nodes are placed into a random location in the network.
We note that given location information of the neighborhood may give rise to another
optimal attack for wireless sensor networks with key predistribution schemes. However, we
assume that the adversary is not aware of its neighborhood. We have generated results for
the identity-optimized adversarial attack through simulation. The result of the identity-
optimized spoofing attack is that the success of the spoofing occurs at a sharp threshold.
We note that the number of nodes required to successfully spoof one specific node identity
(χ = 1) for each of the key predistribution schemes base, reg, and tkey[2, 9], were all
very similar. This is shown in Figure 6.13 for base and reg.
We also examine the identity-optimized adversarial attack for χ = 1 to 5 nodes, com-
paring random key predistribution to the regular key predistribution schemes. In Figure
6.13, we show px vs. pc for base(1000, 100, 100000) and reg(1000, 100, 50000) with χ = 1
and χ = 5. Here, reg requires nearly twice the number of nodes to be compromised com-
pared to base for the identity-optimized adversarial attack of χ = {1, 5} nodes. In Figure
6.14, we see the fraction pc of the network required to be compromised by the identity-
optimized attack to achieve a successful node-spoof for each KPS. Our results show that
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reg, tkey(λ = 2)and tkey(λ = 9) possess similar behavior with regard to this attack for
every value of χ. base performs the worst with regard to this attack, where for χ = 5,
the base network requires pc = 0.25, where as each of the regular KPS require between
pc = [0.35, 0.40]. This disparity is significant. The reduced resilience of this attack is caused
by the large key pool size. In In reg and tkey, the verifying (neighbor) nodes have a much
larger fraction of the key pool, significantly reducing the number of partially spoofed nodes
that pass the validation test.
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Figure 6.13: px vs.pc given the identity-optimized attack model, χ = {1, 5}, for base,
reg, n = 1000, m = 100, pk = 0.10.
6.6 Summary
We have examined the node-spoofing attack for key predistribution schemes used in wireless
sensor networks. Additionally, we have proposed two key predistribution schemes that
provide a higher resilience to the node-spoofing attack: regular key predistribution, reg,
and threshold regular key predistribution scheme, tkey. Both of these schemes provide an
increased resilience to the node-spoof attack in the lower range of pk, where link security is
high. The gains are realized by enforcing a uniform distribution of keys present in the nodes
in the network and by implementing a λ-secure property for each of the keys. tkey provides
resilience against the node-spoof attack to a certain threshold, where beyond the threshold,
the key predistribution scheme is vulnerable. Given a situation where the expected number
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Figure 6.14: px vs.pc given the identity-optimized attack model, χ = {1, 5}, for base,
reg, n = 1000, m = 100, pk = 0.10.
of compromised nodes is bounded, tkey is more desirable for use over reg or other key
predistribution schemes. In conclusion, we infer that adopting a uniform distribution of the
usage of keys in the network can improve the resilience of node-spoofing spoofing attacks
for other key predistribution schemes.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
To conclude this thesis, we provide a summary of the contributions to the research areas of
cryptography, network security, and wireless sensor networks. This thesis has documented
an analysis of link and network security pertaining to resource-constrained wireless devices.
With constraints on available energy, processing capability, transmission power, and mem-
ory, new algorithms and schemes need to be developed and analyzed for proper deployment
and usage. Furthermore, the operation of these networks and their constituent devices oc-
curs in harsh and also adversarial environments, where security services are necessary. The
ability to perform intended tasks with the added requirement of information security exac-
erbates the constraints of these devices. We have developed and analyzed schemes for these
networks of resource-constrained devices to achieve sufficient resilience against adversarial
attacks while still providing adequate levels of networking performance. We have separated
the research of this thesis into contributions of link security and network security.
In Chapter 3, we analyzed the security of a new cryptographic primitive for use in hand-
held devices [16, 17, 24]. The specific contributions with regard to link security that were
presented in this thesis are as follows.
1. We have analyzed the security of a private key cryptosystem based on the finite-field
wavelet, the Wavelet Block Cipher (WBC). We investigated classical and new crypt-
analytic attacks against the wavelet cryptosystem. We did not find any vulnerabilities
of WBC with regard to classical cryptanalytic techniques. Furthermore, we developed
variants of the interpolation, delta function, and discrete Fourier transform-based at-
tacks and showed that these attacks cannot do better than the exhaustive key search
method.
2. We studied the computational complexity of WBC, the polyphase representation of
the wavelet transform allows for WBC decryption to have almost half the complexity
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compared to WBC encryption. The 128-bit WBC encryption has a computational
complexity lower than DES and comparable to AES with key sizes of 64 and 128 bits,
respectively. Additionally, the complexity of the wavelet decryption is lower than both
DES and AES decryption.
We considered several problems within the topic of wireless sensor networks [19, 23].
The underlying research problem that we analyzed was the performance of networks in
the presence of an adversarial attack. We considered key predistribution schemes for use
with wireless sensor networks and studied the effect of node-compromise attacks. In Chap-
ter 4, we considered the resilience of global network connectivity in the context of node-
compromise attacks [14, 15, 79, 80]. The contributions pertaining to secure connectivity
and node-compromise attacks are as follows.
1. We established expressions for the communication range required for connectivity
in several different wireless network models employing key predistribution. We de-
termined the resource cost of implementing key predistribution schemes on wireless
sensor networks in relation to global network connectivity.
2. We examined the effect of node-compromise attacks on the communication range
required for networks to maintain secure connectivity. Determining the effect of node-
compromise attacks on these networks required the derivation of the rate of link
compromise for key predistribution schemes.
3. We proposed a resiliency-connectivity metric, which is a measure of communication
range as a function of the magnitude of the adversarial node-compromise attack. This
metric allows for networks to compare their resilience in terms of connectivity against
node-compromise attacks.
4. Our analysis shows that the multivariate symmetric polynomial key predistribution
scheme possesses greater resilience, in terms of network connectivity, to node-compromise
attacks compared to the random key predistribution scheme.
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As an extension to the work presented in Chapter 4, we investigated other network
properties and their resilience to node-compromise attacks. In Chapter 5, we considered
the metrics of packet latency and achievable throughput for wireless sensor networks [96].
Our contributions are as follows.
1. We investigated the resilience of average packet latency as a function of the num-
ber of nodes compromised. We considered different key predistribution schemes and
compared their resilience to node-compromise attacks with regard to several network
properties.
2. We determined the maximum achievable throughput of a network for various degrees
of node-compromise attacks. Similar to the analysis of packet latency, we studied the
resilience of the achievable throughput of a network employing key predistribution
schemes as a function of the number of compromised nodes.
3. To present another perspective of the latency within networks employing key predis-
tribution schemes, we considered the distance from the sink node as a parameter.
The average packet latency of nodes at various distances from the sink node was
considered.
4. We established the connection between the resilience results of maximum throughput
and average packet latency and the results shown for connectivity in Chapter 4 for the
multivariate symmetric key predistribution and random key predistribution schemes.
We also consider the node-spoof attack on wireless sensor networks [18]. Given a suc-
cessfully spoofed node in the network, the adversary can launch more powerful attacks.
We studied the node-spoof attack and presented approaches to increase the resilience of a
network to this variety of attack.
1. We developed an adversarial model for use with the node-spoof attack. We studied
the probability of node-spoof as a function the probability of secure key establishment
for networks employing various existing key predistribution schemes.
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2. We proposed a regular key predistribution scheme to provide increased resilience of
networks to node-spoof attacks. Our design approach fixed the number of times each
key appeared in a node in the network. We showed that this method improved the
resilience of the random key predistribution scheme against node-spoof attacks.
3. We also proposed a scheme that establishes a threshold effect on each of the keys.
It was shown that the threshold regular key predistribution scheme provided greater
resilience to spoofing attacks compared to both the random and the regular key pre-
distribution schemes.
4. We considered optimal node-compromise attacks in terms of maximizing the probabili-
ties of link-compromise and node-spoofing. When optimizing for the node-spoofing at-
tack, it was shown that it provides improvement to the probability of link-compromise
compared to a random node-compromise approach. Optimizing for link-compromise
does not demonstrate this property. In some cases, a link-compromise optimizing
attack fares only as good as the random node-compromise attack for node-spoofing.
It is determined that the node-spoofing optimal attack is more powerful than the
link-compromise optimal attack.
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APPENDIX A
MATRIX REPRESENTATION OF THE ELEMENTARY
ENCRYPTION BLOCKS FOR THE WAVELET TRANSFORM
In this appendix, we define the matrix operations for which the elementary encryption block
for the wavelet transform can be represented. The output y(n) of the wavelet transform
can be represented with matrix operations as a function of x(n) and the secret key or filter
coefficients, e00(n). Define the following matrices:
A =


1 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 1 0


B =


0 1 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 · · · 0 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 1


,
where A represents the downsampling function [↓2], and B is a unit shift to the left that
is followed by the downsampling function, [↓2]. Using (2.4), it can be shown from Figure
3.2 that the input and output relation of the elementary encryption block can be written
as y = (G0A+G1B)x, where the input and output are represented by two vectors x and y,
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respectively. Equivalently, in the polyphase representation, we define
C =


1 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 1 · · · 0 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 0 1
0 0 0 · · · 0 0


, D =


0 0 0 · · · 0 0
1 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 1 0 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 1


S =


0 0 · · · 0 1 0 0 · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0 0 1 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0
... 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 · · · 0 · · · 0 · · · 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 1 0 0 0 · · · 0


where C is the upsampling function [↑2], D represents the upsampling function [↑2] followed
by a unit shift to the right, and Eoo is the matrix representation of the polyphase filter. The
matrix S represents the z−
M−1
2 cyclic shift operation. In the matrix S, the 1 in the first
row is at the (M−12
th
) column. Therefore, the input and output relation of the elementary
encryption block in Fig. 3.3 can be written as
Y = (DE00A+ CE00B + C(E00 + S)A+D(E00 + S)B)x (A.1)
Y = Tx. (A.2)
We will refer to the elementary encryption block by the matrix T . Similar matrix repre-
sentation exists for the decryption block of Fig. 3.5. We denote this matrix as F for the
remainder of this work.
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APPENDIX B
PROBABILITY OF LINK COMPROMISE DERIVATION FOR
REGULAR AND REGULAR THRESHOLD KEY PREDISTRIBUTION
In this appendix, we derive the probability of link compromise based on the classical balls
and bins problem. First, we state some well-known combinatorial relationships. Then, we
derive expressions for px,REG and px,TKEY .
B.1 Facts
We use these combinatorial relationships for our derivation.
i
(
L
i
)
=
iL!
i!(L− i)! = L
(
L− 1
i− 1
)
(B.1)
(1 + x+ x2 + · · ·+ xm)L = 1− x
m
(1− x)L (B.2)
1
(1− x)L =
∑
k
(
L− 1 + k
k
)
xk (B.3)
(1− xm)L =
L∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
L− 1
j
)
xjm (B.4)
B.2 Probability of link-compromise
We use the balls and bins problem to derive expressions for the probability of link compro-
mise for the regular and regular threshold key predistribution schemes. We consider P keys
(bins) or polynomials and ψ total key shares (balls). Each key is present a times, and ϕ
key shares are required for a polynomial to be compromised. In the case of REG, ϕ = 1.
We find the total combinations of n compromised key shares distributed among L poly-
nomials with a maximum m key shares per polynomial. We want the coefficient of Aψx
ψ
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for the following expression
P∑
i=0
i
(
P
i
)
(xϕ + xϕ+1 + · · ·xa)i(1 + x+ · · ·xϕ−1)P−i (B.5)
P (1 + x+ · · ·xϕ−1)
P∑
i=1
(
P − 1
i− 1
)
(xϕ + xϕ+1 + · · ·xa)i(1 + x+ · · ·xϕ−1)(P−i−1)
P (xϕ + xϕ+1 + · · ·xa)(1 + x+ · · ·+ xa)P−1
P (xϕ + xϕ+1 + · · ·xa)
(
1− xm+1
(1− x)
)P−1
P (xϕ + xϕ+1 + · · ·xa) (1− xa+1)P−1 1
(1− x)P−1
P (xϕ + xϕ+1 + · · ·xa)
(
∞∑
ℓ=0
(
P − 2 + ℓ
ℓ
)
xℓ
)P−1∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
P − 1
j
)
x(a+1)j

 (B.6)
In (B.6), the (xϕ + xϕ+1 + · · ·xa) term provides degrees ϕ through a. The second and
third terms need to provide degrees ψ − ϕ through ψ − a. The third term provides degrees
of x in multiples of (a+ 1)j. The Aψx
ψ term is:
xψ
a∑
k=ϕ
P−1∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
P − 1
j
)
xj(a+1)
(
P − 2 + (ψ − k − j(a+ 1))
(ψ − k − j(a+ 1))
)
(B.7)
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We also find the total number of combinations of ψ key shares distributed to P polyno-
mials with a maximum of a per bin. This is a known result from [95]. This is obtained by
finding the xψ coefficient in (1 + x+ · · ·xa)P . This is determined by
(1 + x+ · · ·xa)P =
(
1− xa+1
1− x
)
(
∞∑
ℓ=0
(
P − 1 + ℓ
ℓ
)
xℓ
) P∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
P
j
)
x(a+1)j


Similar to the previous derivation, the second term provides the degrees of x in multiples
of (a+ 1)j. The xψ term will be:
xn
P∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
P
j
)(
P − 1 + (ψ − j(a+ 1))
(ψ − j(a+ 1))
)
(B.8)
Therefore, the general expression for the probability of link compromise is determined from
(B.6) and (B.8). This expression is a function of ϕ, the number of key shares per key
required for any key to be compromised.
pℓϕ(ψ,ϕ) =
∑a
k=ϕ
∑P−1
j=0 (−1)j
(
P−1
j
)(P−2+(ψ−k−j(a+1))
(ψ−k−j(a+1))
)
P
∑P
ℓ=0(−1)ℓ
(
P
ℓ
)(P−1+(ψ−ℓ(a+1))
(ψ−ℓ(a+1))
) (B.9)
Finally, the probability of link compromise for REG and TKEY are as follows
pℓ,REG = pℓϕ(pcnm, 1) (B.10)
and
pℓ,TKEY = pℓϕ(pcnτ, λ+ 1). (B.11)
These relationships are also used to determine the probability of a successful node-
spoofing attack for regular key predistribution schemes.
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